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"[T]he new federal government will ... be disinclined to invade the
rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their governments." 1
"[T]he Constitution of the United States ...recognizes and preserves
the autonomy and independence of the States-independence in their
legislative and independence in their judicial departments.... Any
interference with either, except as [constitutionally] permitted, is an
invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its
independence." 2

I. Introduction

The understanding expressed by these opening quotes-that the national
government was designed to be one oflimited powers that would refrain from
encroaching upon the sphere ofauthority reserved for the states-is at the core
of the long ascendant legal doctrine of federalism.3 Familiar to all by now,
modem-day federalism, generally, is a doctrine that takes constitutional limits
on federal power seriously and demands respect for the sovereignty of states,
protecting them against wayward impositions on their authority. Although the
Constitution has several provisions enshrining federalism principles, the central
I. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
2. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).
3. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) ("In this relation, then, the proposed
government cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain
enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty
over all other objects.") (emphasis added).
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federalism passage in that document is the Tenth Amendment, which reads:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."4 This clause and others reflecting federalism principles were
reinvigorated by the Rehnquist Court, which was renowned for its active
embrace of federalism.5 The Court's federalist leanings under the late Chief
Justice Rehnquist led it to invalidate federal action on several notable occasions
on the ground that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority and
intruded upon the sovereignty of the states.6 However, this "federalism
revolution" as some would call it has not been confined to the courts. A core
theme of Republican Party politics since Ronald Regan assumed the presidency
has been the vigorous promotion of new federalism and states' rights. 7

4. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
5. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Book Review, 41 TRIAL 62, 62 (Feb. 2005) (reviewing
THOMAS M. KECK,THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY) ( "Rehnquist has helped
move the Supreme Court in a more conservative direction,especially in reviving federalism as a
limit on congressional and federal judicial power .. . ."); Stephen G. Calabresi,Federalism and
the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD.POL.& Soc. SCI. 24, 25
(200 I) ( "Perhaps the most striking feature of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence has been the
revival over the last 5-10 years of doctrines of constitutional federalism....Not since before
the New Deal-era constitutional revolution of 1937 have the states received such protection in
the U.S. Supreme Court from allegedly burdensome federal statutes.").
6. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison,529 U.S. 598,627 (2000) (stating that Congress
lacked the constitutional authority to enact 42 U.S.C.§ 13981 under either the Commerce
Clause or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999)
(stating that neither the Supremacy Clause nor any enumerated powers of Congress conferred
authority to abrogate States' immunity as was allowed under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C.§ 201 et seq.); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.Expense Bd. v. College
Sav.Bank,527 U.S.627,647 (1999) (finding that the Patent Remedy Act,35 U.S.C.§§ 271(h),
296(a),could not abrogate a State's sovereign immunity); Printz v.United States,521 U.S.898,
918 (1997) (declaring that interim provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968,18 U.S.C.§ 921,
violated the constitutional provision of dual sovereignty and separation of powers); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,536 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1991,42 U.S.C.§ 2000bb et seq., was unconstitutional as it applied to the states because
it exceeded the power of Congress under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18
U.S.C.§ 922(q)(1)(A), because it was beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause).
7. See Ronald Regan, President's Inaugural Address, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 1, 2 (Jan. 20,
1981) (speaking of his "intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and
to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal Government
and those reserved to the States or to the people."); see also CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE
BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO
CHANGE THE NATION 125-41 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas, eds. 1994) (explaining that the
philosophy behind the Contract with America was one of devolution of power to the states).
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Interestingly, in the midst of continued political rhetoric in support of
federalism8 and the Court's stern rejection ofrecent congressional Commerce
Clause legislation on federalism grounds, Congress has pursued legislation, and
the Supreme Court has rendered decisions, that impose upon, supplant, or usurp
the judicial authority of states and their courts.9 In a spate offederal tort reform
efforts, Congress has variously sought to regulate state judicial procedure
directly by limiting the award of punitive damages in state courts for state law
claims, to require the application of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in state court proceedings,10 and to determine intrastate venue in
personal injury actions in state courts. 11 Meanwhile, the Court has expanded
federal jurisdiction over state law claims through expansive preemption
doctrines 12 and expansive interpretations of federal jurisdictional statutes, 13
which has had the practical effect of depriving states of the ability to adjudicate
claims arising under their own laws. Most alarmingly, both Congress and the
Court have reached out to review and invalidate the final determinations of
state courts on matters traditionally within their sphere of authority, vacating
state court punitive damages awards as "excessive," 14 reversing the order of a
recount deemed to be required under state law in a Presidential election, 15 and
8. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at National
Governors' Association Meeting (Feb. 26, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
200 l /02/20010226-8.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2006) ("The framers of the Constitution did not
believe in an all-knowing, all-powerful federal government. They believed that our freedom is
best preserved when power is dispersed. That is why they limited and enumerated the federal
government's powers, and reserved the remaining functions of government to the states.") (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. See generally Anthony J. Bellia, Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110
YALE L.J. 947 (200 l ) (identifying this legislative and judicial trend). As Professor Bellia states:
"Congress has turned its attention to regulating the state courts. In recent years, Congress has
considered several bills, and enacted a few of them, seeking to regulate interstate commerce by
regulating the way state courts conduct litigation." Id. at 950. Although Professor Bellia rightly
noted that "[t]he next frontier of federalism is the relationship between Congress and the state
courts," id. at 100 l , his critique of the trend was ultimately lukewarm and premature. Much has
happened in this area since the time of Professor Bellia's article to suggest that the more strident
critique and proposal put forth in this Article is due.
IO. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 109th Cong.§ 3 (1st Sess. 2005).
l 1. /J.§ 4.
12. See infra Parts II.A & II.C.2 (discussing implied preemption of state law actions and
the usurpation of state jurisdiction through removal under the complete preemption doctrine).
13. See infra Parts II.C. l & II.C.3 (explaining how the broad scope of federal question
and supplemental jurisdiction has cabined the jurisdiction of state courts).
14. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996); see infra Part II.D. l
(discussing BMW in detail).
15. Bush v. Gore, 53 l U.S. 98, l l l (2000); see infra Part II.D.2 (analyzing the
overreaching of the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore).
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authorizing federal district court review of a right-to-die dispute conclusively
resolved by state courts. 16
I refer to each of these federal efforts to control or usurp state court
jurisdiction or procedure with respect to state law claims 17 as anti-federalist 18
procedure. That is, anti-federalist procedure, as herein discussed, refers to
federally-generated policies or doctrines that limit, control, or eliminate the
ability of state courts to adjudicate state law claims in their courts or to devise
and impose their own procedures for how such claims are litigated and
resolved. Although the particular manifestations of anti-federalist procedure
need not be illegitimate exercises of federal power, they often are.
This Article will review some of the more notable instances of anti
federalist procedure, offering a critique and proposing statutory and doctrinal
revisions needed to put matters right. Part II presents specific examples of anti
federalist procedure, offering some critique and analysis along the way. A full
critique is reserved for Part III, wherein the Article details the significant
constitutional difficulties with anti-federalist procedure. In Part IV, I present a
vision of what federalism-respecting procedure would look like in the statutory
and doctrinal areas discussed in Part II, ultimately recommending fairly drastic
alterations of Supreme Court doctrines and a less radical statutory modification.

16. See Relief of the Parents ofTheresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3,§ 1, 119 Stat.
15, 15 (2005) (granting the U.S. District Court for the Middle District ofFlorida jurisdiction to
hear any claim brought by the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo regarding the provision oflife
support); see also infra Part 11.D.3 (providing background on the Schiavo case and addressing
the impropriety of this legislation).
17. The extent to which Congress may regulate how state courts adjudicate federally
created rights is a more settled matter beyond the scope of this article. Professor Bellia
summarizes the law in that area as follows:
Congress may require state courts to enforce federal claims if they are competent to
do so; Congress may require state courts to enforce federal procedural rules that are
"part and parcel" of a federal right of action; and Congress may, by implication,
require state courts to follow federal procedural rules when application of a state
procedural rule would unnecessarily burden a federal right.
Bellia, supra note 9, at 962.
18. The Anti-Federalists of the founding era were those who argued in favor of states'
rights at the Constitutional Convention, while the Federalists defended the strengthened central
government devised by the proposed Constitution, meaning that one could easily use the term
"anti-federalist" to describe proponents of states' rights today. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, No
Federalists Here: Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the Rehnquist Court, 31 RUTGERS L.J.
741, 741 (2000) (referring to the Court's defenders of state sovereignty as "Anti-Federalists").
However, in modern parlance federalists are those who subscribe to the new federalism that
emphasizes limited federal government and a respect for state sovereignty. Thus, anti-federalist
policies, as I describe them, are those that contravene these principles of the new federalism.
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II. Anti-Federalist Procedure
A. Implied Preemption ofState Law Actions

Perhaps the heartland of anti-federalist procedure is found within implied
preemption doctrine. It is in the name of implied preemption that the Court has
often found itself barring state law based claims that litigants have sought to
assert. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. 19 provides a good example of this
phenomenon. Petitioner Alexis Geier was seriously injured in an accident
involving a 1987 Honda Accord she was driving.20 Although her vehicle was
equipped with manual shoulder and lap belts, which she was wearing, the
vehicle was not outfitted with airbags.2 1 Geier sued American Honda Motor
Company, the car's manufacturer, and its affiliates under District of Columbia
tort law claiming negligent and defective design for failure to install airbags. 22
At issue in the case was whether Geier's suit was permitted in light of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the Safety Act), which
expressly preempted '" any safety standard' that is not identical to a federal
safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance. "23 Because the
applicable federal safety standard, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
(FMVSS) 208, required auto manufacturers to equip some but not all of their
1987 vehicles with passive restraints (which would include airbags), the district
court concluded that Geier's lawsuit sought to establish a safety standard
requiring airbags and thus would be a conflicting state standard that would be
expressly preempted under the terms of the Act.24 On review, the Court of
Appeals had its doubts about the district court's finding of express preemption
in light of the Act's saving clause,25 but reached the same result as the district
court by reasoning that permitting the lawsuit would pose an obstacle to the
objectives of FMVSS 208.26 After its review of the case, the Supreme Court
19. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000) (stating that petitioner's
claim was preempted even though the Act at issue did not expressly preempt a state law based
suit).
20. Id. at 865.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting 15 U. S.C.§ 1392(d) (1988) (recodified at 49 U.S.C.§ 30101 et seq.
(2000))).
24. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (2000))
(" Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does
not exempt any person from any liability under common law.").
26. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236, 1238--43 (D. C. Cir. 1999), cert
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reached the same result, holding that although the Safety Act did not expressly
preempt state law based suits challenging the failure to install airbags, such
suits actually conflicted with the objectives of FMVSS 208.2 7
Justice Stevens, writing for a four-Justice minority, dissented in Geier.28
Finding no conflict between FMVSS 208 and the instant state tort suit, Justice
Stevens wrote:
It is . . . clear to me that the objectives that the Secretary intended to
achieve through the adoption of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
208 would not be frustrated one whit by allowing state courts to determine
whether in 1 987 the lifesaving advantages of airbags had become
sufficiently obvious that their omission might constitute a design defect in
some new cars. 29

Also of central importance to Justice Stevens was the Safety Act's saving
clause, which provided: "Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety
standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any
liability under common law.1130 In Justice Stevens' s view, this clause not only
expressly preserved state common law remedies but it also "arguably denie[d]
the Secretary [of Transportation] the authority to promulgate standards that
would pre-empt common-law remedies."3 1 Given the presence of the savings
clause and the silence ofFMVSS 208 with respect to its own preemptive force,
Justice Stevens felt that the historical presumption against preemption had not
been overcome.32
What we have in Geier then is the Court acknowledging that no express
preemption is achieved by the statute but nonetheless implying preemption
based on its own judgment regarding the conflict between the objectives ofthe
Secretary ofTransportation and the allowance ofthe type ofstate law claims at
issue in that case. But given the Court's own conclusion that Congress had not
expressly preempted state common law actions, plus the presence of a saving
clause, such a determination by the Court was unwarranted. As Justice Stevens
remarked in Geier, "the Supremacy Clause does not give unelected federal
granted, 527 U.S. 1 063 ( 1 999), ajf'd, 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

27 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 86 1 , 866 (2000).
28. Id. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined in
the opinion.
29. Id. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 397(k) ( 1 988).
3 1 . Geier, 529 U.S. at 899-900 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. See id. at 905--06 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is evident that Honda has not crossed
the high threshold established by our decisions regarding pre-emption of state laws that
allegedly frustrate federal purposes.").
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judges carte blanche to use federal law as a means ofimposing their own ideas
of tort reform on the States. "33 Respect for the constitutional role of the states
as sovereign entities demands that states be ousted of their traditional
jurisdiction over common law tort actions only upon the clearest expression of
congressional intent or where simultaneous compliance with federal and state
law is impossible. The problems with the implied preemption doctrine will be
discussed in greater detail in Part III.
B. Federally-Imposed Litigation Reform

Since 1994 when Republicans took over control of the U.S. House of
Representatives, litigation reform (more commonly referred to as "tort reform")
has been a congressional priority.34 In their "Contract with America" one of the
first things Republican Members of Congress pledged to do once they gained
majority control was to introduce the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of
1995, which in their words would consist of '"Loser pays' laws, reasonable
limits on punitive damages and reform of product liability laws to stem the
endless tide oflitigation. "35 In addition to these measures, one finds in the text
of the proposed bill attached to the Contract with America a separate measure
entitled the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 36 The
PSLRA ultimately became law,37 as have several other significant reform
measures at least nominally intended to improve what proponents see as a
broken and abused litigation system.
Because state judicial proceedings represent the lion's share oflitigation
activity in this country, in order to have any hopes of achieving their objectives
of widespread litigation reform, lawmakers have had to target their reforms not
only at the federal system, but at state judicial systems as well. Given the
separate sovereignty of states and their unquestioned authority to adjudicate
state law claims falling within their traditional sphere of control, any federal
33. Id. at 894.
34 The changeover in Congress to thin Democratic control after the 2006 mid-term
elections will likely spell the end to this focus.
35. CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html
(last visited Dec. 4, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 7, at 11 (providing a more detailed version of the
Republicans' Contract with America than what is found online).
36. H.R. I058, 104th Cong. (1995), available at http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/
Legalrefb.txt.
37. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of l 995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995).
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effort to direct, limit, or eliminate state court jurisdiction would necessarily
be anti-federalist in nature. That is, modem federalism principles ordinarily
call for a respect of "dual sovereignty" 38 and are wary of infringing on the
legitimate authority of states. This section considers several examples of
congressional measures-some enacted and others not-that in some way
have sought to control or eliminate the ability ofstate courts to adjudicate or
provide remedies for state law claims in the name of achieving nationwide
litigation reform.
J. A ttempts to Limit State-Imposed Punitive Damages

Throughout the late 1990s congressional Republicans pursued attempts
to limit punitive damages awards in the products liability area. The first
litigation reform measure introduced by the House majority after taking
control from the Democrats was the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of
1995 . 39 Most of the bill proposed changes that only would have applied to
federal civil litigation. However, section 103 of the bill, entitled "Product
Liability Reform," contained product liability rules applicable to product
sellers and preempted state laws to the extent such laws covered the same
issues comprehended by the proposed liability rules.40 In addition to these
substantive legal rules, the bill also included punitive damages caps for
products liability actions-the greater of"3 times the amount awarded to the
claimant for the economic injury on which such claim is based, or
$250,000."4 1 This provision of the bill expressly would have covered "any
product liability action brought in any State or Federal Court against any
manufacturer or seller of a product on any theory for harm caused by the
product" and thus would have told states that their courts could not impose
punitive damages awards in amounts deemed appropriate.
The bill did not make it out of the House ofRepresentatives. However,
another attempt to limit the level of punitive damages that state courts could
impose, the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996,
soon followed.42 It passed both houses of Congress but was blocked by

38. Printz v. United States, 52 1 U.S. 898, 9 1 8 ( 1 997) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 457 ( 1 99 1 )).
39. H.R. 1 0, 1 04th Cong. ( 1 st Sess. 1 995).
40. Id. § 1 03.
41. Id.
42. H.R. 956, 1 04th Cong. (2d Sess. 1 996).
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President Clinton's veto. 43 This legislation would have imposed stricter
punitive damages caps than its predecessor-twice the level of compensatory
damages or $250,000-and also would have required claimants to
"establish[] by clear and convincing evidence that conduct carried out by the
defendant with a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of
others was the proximate cause of the harm that is the subject of the action in
any product liability action. "44 The bill contained an "Exception for
Insufficient Award in Cases of Egregious Conduct"45 that empowered judges
to disregard these caps if-after the consideration of eight factors spelled out
in the proposed statute-the judge determined that the limited award would
be "insufficient to punish the egregious conduct of the defendant."46
In the wake of President Clinton's veto, Senate Republicans tried their
hand at products liability reform the following year by introducing the
Product Liability Reform Act of 1997. 47 Citing a concern that excessive
punitive damages "penalties are harmful to business and to consumers of
products when price reflects the risk of such penalties, "48 section 108 of the
bill (entitled "Uniform Standards for Award of Punitive Damages") included
a "clear and convincing evidence" standard49 similar to the failed bill of the
prior Congress. The bill expressly preempted state law and declared its
applicability to "any product liability action brought in any State or Federal
court on any theory for harm caused by a product.11 50 B y mandating the
standard of proof necessary to support an award of punitive damages, this
legislation would have limited the ability of states to punish tortfeasors and
undermined states' own punitive damages policies. However, this bill never
made it out of the Senate, although a substantially similar version of the bill
was reintroduced in 1 998, with similar results. 5 1
43. See THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ON THOMAS,http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?dl 04:HR00956:@@@ S (last visited Dec.4,2006) (providing the full history ofthe Common
Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1 996) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
44. H.R. REP.No. 104-481§ 1 08(a) (1996) (accompanying H.R. 956).
45. Id.§ 108(b)(3).
46. Id. § 1 08(b)(3)(A).
47. S. 648,105th Cong. (1997).
48. S.REP. No. 1 05-32,at 6 (1997) (quoting William Fry,Executive Director ofHALT,in
his testimony before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs,Foreign Commerce,and Tourism,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Apr. 3, 1995).
49. S. 648,105th Cong.§ 108(a) (1997).
50. Id. § 102(a)(l ).
51. See S. 2236, 105th Cong. ( 1 998) (proposing "to establish legal standards and
procedures for products liability litigation and for other purposes ").
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2. SecuritiesLitigation Uniform Standards A ct

Republicans were much more successful in their efforts at reforming
litigation in the securities fraud area. The 104th Congress enacted ( over
another Presidential veto) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA), which-most importantly-imposed heightened pleading
requirements for asserting securities fraud claims. 52 Because the statute only
applied to claims pursued in federal court, Congress quickly found that
litigants were migrating covered claims to state courts in order to avoid the
strictures of the PSLRA.53 In response to this perceived migration, Congress
enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA),
the express goal of which was to prevent litigants from circumventing and
thereby undermining the purposes of the PSLRA. 54 To achieve this goal,
SLUSA preempts covered securities class actions, pertaining to the "purchase
or sale" of certain securities, brought in state court under state law and makes
them removable to federal court.55 Further, SLUSA directs that preemption

52. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 2 1 D(b)(2), 1 09 Stat. 737 (1 995) (codified at 1 5 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(b)(2) (2000)) (stating that in a private action for money damages the plaintiff must
prove the defendant acted with the required intent); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (describing the Act as imposing, beginning in 1 995, stricter pleading
requirements in private securities fraud actions that, among other things, require that a
complaint "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required [fraudulent] state of mind").
53. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. I 05-353 § 2(2),
1 1 2 Stat. 3227 ("[S]ince enactment of [the PSLRA], considerable evidence has been presented
to Congress that a number of securities class action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State
courts.").
54. See id. § 2(5) ("[I]n order to prevent certain State private securities class action
lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1 995, it is appropriate to enact national standards for securities class
action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities . . . . "); see also Kircher v. Putnam Funds
Trust, 403 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 2005) ("SLUSA is designed to prevent plaintiffs from
migrating to state court in order to evade rules for federal securities litigation in the [PSLRA]."),
vacated, 1 26 S. Ct. 2 145 (2006).
55. See Erb v. Alliance Capital Mgmt, 423 F.3d 647, 648 (7th Cir. 2005) (addressing a
class-action, breach-of-contract claim against a mutual fund manager for buying poorly rated
securities). The Seventh Circuit explained that:
SLUSA preempts a claim only ifit: (i) is brought by a private party; (ii) is brought
as a covered class action; (iii) is based on state law; (iv) alleges that the defendant
misrepresented or omitted a material fact (or employed a manipulative device or
contrivance); and (v) asserts that defendant did so in connection with the purchase
or sale of a covered security.
Id. at 65 1 (citing Disher v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 4 1 9 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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decisions respecting covered actions must be made by federal judges rather
than state courts.56
The effect of this legislation on state court jurisdiction is twofold. First,
state courts are no longer able to retain jurisdiction over state law claims they
otherwise would have a right to hear. Second, state courts are not permitted
to make the preemption determination themselves but must yield the case so
that federal judges can decide the issue. There may be sound federal policy
reasons for both of these aspects of SLUSA. Congress has a right to pursue a
uniform federal policy in the area of securities regulation and thus, permitting
state court actions in this field can plausibly be seen to be a threat to that
objective. Requiring that federal judges make the preemption determination
could be seen as a way to ensure the quality and consistency of such
decisions-things that would be important to maintaining the integrity of the
SLUSA regime. However, it is worth noting that vesting federal courts with
this responsibility has not led to complete uniformity in how courts view the
scope ofSLUSA's preemptive effect. For example, the circuits were divided
over whether claims related solely to the retention of securities, as opposed to
their purchase or sale, are preempted by SLUSA57 until the split was recently
resolved by the Supreme Court.58 In any event, though legitimate rationales
can be proffered in support of SLUSA's measures affecting state court
jurisdiction, it remains the case that Congress chose to strip state courts of
their authority to provide remedies for persons asserting various state law
claims and of their concurrent jurisdiction over preemption determinations,
making SLUSA anti-federalist in tenor.

56. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, tit. 1, sec. I OI(a)(l ), § 16(d)(4)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.§ 77p) ("[I]f the Federal court determines that the action may
be maintained in State court pursuant to this subsection, the Federal court shall remand such
action to such State court.").
57. Compare Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 43 (2d
Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006) ("[I]n enacting SLUSA Congress sought only to
ensure that class actions brought by plaintiffs who satisfy the Blue Chip purchaser-seller rule are
subject to the federal securities laws."), with Disher v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 419 F.3d
649, 655 (7th Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2964 (2006) (holding that SLUSA preempted an
action even though the investor's complaint referred only to the holding of stocks, not to their
'purchase or sale."').
58. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1514-15
(2006) (holding that SLUSA preempts state law class actions alleging that misrepresentations or
omissions induced class members to retain or delay selling covered securities).
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3. Class A ction Fairness A ct

Much has been written on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA)59 and thus little more needs to be said here. 60 Professor Morrison
summed up CAFA nicely when he wrote, "Its main thrust is procedural: it
would permit defendants to remove from state to federal court most damages
class actions, in particular those cases based on state law, which currently can
only be litigated in state court. "6 1 CAFA does this by expanding diversity
jurisdiction to cover class actions of 100 or more class members whose claims
aggregate to greater than $5,000,00062 and by eliminating various barriers to
the removal of such cases to federal court.63 As with previous federal litigation
reform measures, CAFA was enacted in response to a perception that lawyers
were abusing class actions. Specifically, the Senate Judiciary committee
indicated that CAFA was needed to combat the ability of lawyers to "'game'
the procedural rules and keep nationwide or multi-state class actions in state
courts whose judges have reputations for readily certifying classes and
approving settlements . . . ."64 Ultimately, Congress was not satisfied with the
outcomes of class actions heard in state courts, particularly in certain "magnet
courts" known for their favorable pro-plaintiff bent, and felt that state judges
were simply too lax in their scrutiny of proposed class actions. 65 Here again,
59. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1 09-2, 1 1 9 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 7 1 1-1 5, 1 453 (2000)).
60. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way
to Handle the Problem ofOverlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1 52 1 , 1 535-42 (2005)
(discussing the procedural implications of the Class Action Fairness Act of2005 which permits
defendants to remove from state to federal court most class actions-in particular, cases based
on state law which until this point could only be litigated in state court).
61. Id. at 1 522.
62. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 1 09-2, § 4(a)(2), 1 1 0 Stat. 4, 9-1 2
(amending 2 8 U.S.C.§ 1 332, which outlines provisions fo r federal district court jurisdiction of
interstate class actions).
63. See id. § 5(b) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1 453) (setting provisions for the
removal of interstate class actions to federal district court). The statute states:
A class action may be removed to a district court of the United States in accordance
with section 1 446 (except that the I -year limitation under section l 446(b) shall not
apply), without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which
the action is brought, except that such action may be removed by any defendant
without the consent of all defendants.
Id.
64. S. REP. No. 1 09-1 4, at 4 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5.
Additionally, the report states: "This Committee believes that the current diversity and removal
standards as applied in interstate class actions have facilitated a parade of abuses." Id. at 6.
65. See id. at 1 4 ("[S]ome state court judges are less careful than their federal court
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we find Congress indulging its anti-federalist impulses to impose on the judicial
authority of states based on its dissatisfaction with the results that state courts
were producing when they adjudicated state law claims over which they
properly had jurisdiction.
4. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act

This past Congress considered legislation entitled the Lawsuit Abuse
Reduction Act (LARA),66 a bill that sought to enhance attorney accountability
by strengthening the available sanctions regimes in both federal and state
courts. Specifically, LARA would have amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to make the impositions of sanctions mandatory upon a
finding of a violation, added compensation as an express objective of sanctions
in addition to deterrence, and eliminated the safe harbor that prevents litigants
from going directly to the court with their Rule 11 allegations until they have
given their opponent the opportunity to withdraw the offending filing.67 LARA
would also, among other things, have mandated a one-year suspension for
attorneys found to have violated Rule 11 three or more times.68 More important
for our purposes are the various anti-federalist aspects of the bill. First, the bill
would have made Rule 1 1 applicable in state court proceedings where the judge
determines that "the action substantially affects interstate commerce. "69
Second, LARA purported to determine venue for personal injury actions
brought in state courts, limiting proper venue to those states-and to those
counties within those states-where the claimant resides now or at the time of
the injury, where the claimant was injured, where the defendant resides, or
where the defendant's principal place of business is located. 70 Notably, this
provision of the bill did not limit control over intrastate venue to cases affecting
interstate commerce. Finally, the bill prevented courts from ordering the
concealment of unlawful conduct in the context of Rule 1 1 proceedings,7 1 a
provision that presumably would apply to state courts in instances where
LARA declared Rule 11 to apply. 72
counterparts about applying the procedural requirements that govern class actions.").
66. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 1 09th Cong. ( 1 st Sess. 2005).
67. Id. § 2.
68. Id § 6.
69. Id § 3.
70. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 1 09th Cong.§ 9 ( 1 st Sess. 2005).
71. Id. § 9.
72. See id.§ 3 (stating standards for determining the applicability of Rule 1 1 to state cases
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The patent anti-federalist aspects of this legislation likely explain why
LARA failed to become law during the I 09th Congress. 73 It is doubtful that
Congress has the authority to require state judges to apply the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in their courts simply because the action would impact
interstate commerce. More dubious still is the notion that Congress can lay
venue for personal injury actions brought in state courts, particularly in the
absence of any connection to matters affecting interstate commerce. A full
critique ofall ofthese congressional efforts will occur in Part II, but it is worth
mentioning here the thread that connects each of them: When Congress has
disapproved ofthe results that state courts produce when adjudicating state law
claims, it has sought to usurp state judicial authority either by constraining the
discretion ofstate judges and juries directly or by taking cases away from them
entirely.
C. Usurpation ofState Jurisdiction

Federal efforts to interfere with state court authority over state law claims
have not been limited to the area oflitigation reform, nor have such efforts been
exclusively at the hands of Congress. The Supreme Court has made a
substantial contribution to anti-federalist usurpations ofstate judicial authority
through its broad interpretation of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Just as
the complete diversity requirement74 and the well-pleaded complaint rule75 have
affecting interstate commerce).
73. See THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ON THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bd
query/z?d l 09:HR00420:@@@X (last visited Dec. 4, 2006) (providing the full history ofH.R.
420) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Although the House approved the
measure last fall, the Senate has taken no further action on the bill. Id. In light ofthe change in
party control of both houses of Congress after the 2006 midterm elections, it is unlikely that
LARA will be taken up in the l l 0th Congress.
74. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 ( l 806) (holding that in a case
with multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants, the presence in the action of a single plaintiff
from the same State as a single defendant deprives the district court of original diversity
jurisdiction over the entire action).
75. The Court in Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914) noted:
[W]hether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of the
United States, in the sense of the jurisdictional statute[,] . . . must be determined
from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the
bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of
defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.
See also Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. l ,
9-l O ( l 983) (stating that under the well-pleaded complaint rule a defendant may not remove a
case to federal court where there is no diversity of citizenship unless the plaintiff's complaint
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limited the scope of federal jurisdiction, certain of the Court's decisions
regarding the scope of federal question jurisdiction, removal jurisdiction, and
supplemental jurisdiction have gone in the other direction. At each tum, the
Court has interpreted the relevant statutes broadly in ways that unduly impose
on the ability of state courts to retain cases traditionally within their
jurisdiction. This subpart reviews the Court's decisions in these areas.
I . Expansive Federal Question Jurisdiction

The original jurisdiction of federal district courts extends to "all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."76
In addition to conferring jurisdiction over claims pleading causes of action
created by federal law, the Court has long interpreted the federal question
statute to grant jurisdiction over state law claims when "it appears that some
substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of
the well-pleaded state claims."77 In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Thompson,78 the Court explained that the existence of a "substantial, disputed"
federal issue would not suffice to confer federal question jurisdiction over state
law actions when Congress has precluded federal private remedies for the
federal statute at issue.79
However, recently in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue
Engineering & Manufacturing,80 the Court definitively rejected the idea that the
absence of a federal private right of action in federal statutes implicated in state
law claims precluded federal jurisdiction over those claims. 81 The Court recast
Merrell Dow as a decision not fixated on whether Congress had provided for a
private right of action but rather as a decision that "treat[ed] the absence of a
federal private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the
establishes federal question jurisdiction without regard to defenses implicating federal law).
76. 28 u.s.c.§ 1331 (2000).
77. Franchise Tax Bd, 463 U. S. at 1 3.
78. Merrell Dow Pharrn., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
79. Id. at 814. As the Court states:
We simply conclude that the congressional determination that there should be no
federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a
congressional conclusion that the presence ofa claimed violation of the statute as
an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently "substantial" to confer federal
question jurisdiction.
Id.

80. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
81. Id.at 318- 19.
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'sensitive judgments about congressional intent' that § 1331 requires." 82 In
Merrell Dow, said the Grable & Sons Court, a conclusion that federal
jurisdiction was available for state law claims based on violations offederal law
would have undermined Congress's determination that there be no federal
private right of action for such violations and would have flooded the federal
courts with an enormous amount of cases.83 However, in Grable & Sons the
Court said there was no such threat. Grable & Sons involved a state quiet title
action in which the claimant asserted superior title based on a claimed
deficiency in the notice given by the Internal Revenue Service when it seized
and sold Grable's property.84 Because "it is the rare state quiet title action that
involves contested issues of federal law," said the Court, "jurisdiction over
actions like Grable's would not materially affect, or threaten to affect, the
normal currents of litigation." 85 Based on this finding, the Court concluded,
Given the absence of threatening structural consequences and the clear
interest the Government, its buyers, and its delinquents have in the
availability of a federal forum, there is no good reason to shirk from federal
jurisdiction over the dispositive and contested federal issue at the heart of
the state-law title claim."86

Ultimately, Grable & Sons backtracks substantially from the position set
forth in Me"ell Dow. The Me"el/ Dow Court said unequivocally, "the
congressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the
violation ofthis federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that
the presence ofa claimed violation ofthe statute as an element ofa state cause
ofaction is insufficiently 'substantial' to confer federal-question jurisdiction. "87
After Grable & Sons, that is no longer the case. Rather, such a congressional
82. Id. at 3 1 8 (quoting Me"ell Dow Pharm., Inc., 478 U.S. at 8 1 0).
83. See id. at 3 1 9 ("A general rule of exercising federal jurisdiction over state claims
resting on federal mislabeling and other statutory violations would thus have heralded a
potentially enormous shift of traditionally state cases into federal courts.").
84. Id. at 3 1 0-1 1 .
85. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 3 1 9.
86. Id. at 3 1 9-20. The Court has subsequently indicated that the propriety of federal
jurisdiction in Grable & Sons was buttressed by the fact that the case "presented a nearly 'pure
issue oflaw,' one 'that could be settled once and for all and thereafter would govern numerous
tax sale cases."' Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 1 26 S. Ct. 2 1 2 1 , 2 1 3 7 (2006)
(quoting R. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 65 (2005 Supp.)). The McVeigh Court also highlighted the fact that Grab/e's finding of
federal jurisdiction was in the context of a "dispute . . . centered on the action of a federal
agency (IRS) and its compatibility with a federal statute," 1 26 S. Ct. at 2 1 37, a potential
circumstance that may provide some basis for limiting the breadth and impact of the Grable
decision going forward.
87. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 8 1 4 ( l 986) (emphasis added).
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determination is merely one factor to be considered as part of the Court's
determination of whether permitting federal jurisdiction would be contrary to
"congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and
federal courts." 88 According to the Grable & Sons Court, if federal jurisdiction
over state law claims implicating a particular federal statute appears likely not
to impact a significant number of cases, then Congress's failure to provide for a
private right of action is relegated to congressional "ambivalence" on the matter
that permits the Court to declare itself that "there is no good reason to shirk
from federal jurisdiction. 1189
This, needless to say, is nonsense. Federal question jurisdiction cannot
depend on the Court's own estimation of the volume of state law claims that
would be moved to federal court in the event that federal jurisdiction were
permitted. Federal jurisdiction either is conferred by the statute or it is not.
Further, if congressional intent is supposed to be the indicium of the
permissibility of jurisdiction under § 1331, then certainly the Court should treat
absence of a private right of action as Congress's expression of an intent that
violations of the statute not be litigated in federal courts.
Most importantly, however, are the anti-federalist attributes of the Court's
new approach to federal question jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that "Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute, . . . which is not to be expanded by
judicial decree. 1190 When Congress enacts a statute without making a private
right of action available but the Court nevertheless declares that state law
claims implicating or raising issues respecting those statutes are indeed
cognizable in federal courts, the Court, not Congress, is conferring jurisdiction
over such matters by its own decree. By expanding the jurisdiction of federal
courts over these state law claims in the absence of a true congressional grant of
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has empowered federal courts to hear cases
they have no constitutional authority to hear, robbing state courts ofjurisdiction
over these claims in the process. Unfortunately, in Grable & Sons, the Court
made no mention of a state's sovereign interest in exercising its judicial
authority within its legitimate sphere in its discussion of the considerations
relevant to determining whether federal arising under jurisdiction is available.
If states' sovereign authority to adjudicate disputes involving their own laws
had been truly respected, the Supreme Court would have required that Congress
88. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 3 1 3-14
(2005).
89. Id at 3 1 9-20.
90. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 5 1 1 U.S. 375, 377 ( 1 994).
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speak clearly if it intended to permit federal courts to rob states of their own
claims based on imbedded federal issues.
2. Removal Under the Complete Preemption Doctrine

The federal removal statute permits civil actions "arising under" federal
law to be removed from state court to federal court.91 Ordinarily, the Court
evaluates the removability of actions based on the well-pleaded complaint rule:
[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only
when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is
based upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not enough that the
plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action, and asserts
that the defense is invalidated by some provision ofthe Constitution of the
United States.92

Pursuant to the well-pleaded complaint rule, "federal jurisdiction exists only
when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly
pleaded complaint"93 and thus actions are not removable simply because the
defendant raises a defense based on federal law.94 The rule that federal
defenses fail to confer federal jurisdiction applies even when the federal
defense is one asserting that federal law preempts the state law action in some
way. 95
In Avco Corp. v. International Association ofMachinists and Aerospace
Workers,96 the Supreme Court created an exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule for cases where the Court determines that a federal cause of
action completely preempts a state cause of action.97 The Court later explained
the Avco rule as follows:
The necessary ground of decision was that the preemptive force of § 30 I
[the portion of the federal statute at issue in Avco] is so powerful as to
displace entirely any state cause of action "for violation of contracts
91. 28 u.s.c.§ 1441(b) (2000).
92. Louisville & Nashville R.R.Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.149, 152 (1908).
93. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U. S. 386,392 (1987).
94. See Franchise Tax Bd.ofCal.v.Constr.Laborers Vacation Trust for S.Cal., 463 U.S. I, 910 (1983) (requiring under the well-pleaded complaint rule that the complaint establish federal
question jurisdiction).
95. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 ("[A] case may not be removed to federal court on the basis
of . ..the defense ofpre-emption ....") (emphasis omitted).
96. Avco Corp.v. Int'! Assoc. of Machinist & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
97. See id at 559-60 (finding that federal interpretation of federal law will govern in cases
arising under the Labor Management Relations Act even though the action is brought in state court).
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between an employer and a labor organization." Any such suit is purely a
creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would
provide a cause of action in the absence of § 30 1 . Avco stands for the
proposition that if a federal cause of action completely preempts a state
cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal
cause of action necessarily "arises under" federal law. 98

Thus, this exception, which has come to be known as the complete preemption
doctrine, applies when federal law displaces entirely a state action falling
within the scope of the cause of action made available under the federal law
because, in the Court's words, the state law claim "necessarily 'arises under'
federal law."99
The Court applied the complete preemption doctrine to usurp state court
jurisdiction not too long ago in Beneficial National Bank v. A nderson.100 In
Beneficial National Bank, a group of borrowers brought an action in Alabama
state court against Beneficial for charging excessive interest in violation of
Alabama's common law usury doctrine and an Alabama usury statute. 1 01
Beneficial removed the action to Alabama federal court, arguing that the
National Bank Act 102 exclusively governed the rate of interest that a national
bank may lawfully charge and provided the exclusive remedies available
against a national bank charging excessive interest, thus making the action
removable under the removal statute and the complete preemption doctrine. 1 03
The district court agreed with Beneficial' s position but a panel of the Eleventh
Circuit disagreed on the ground that the relevant provisions of the National
Bank Act disclosed no congressional intent to permit removal of state law
claims preempted by the Act. 1 04 The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh
Circuit, finding the claims to be removable based on complete preemption. 1 05
The Court reasoned that because the National Bank Act provides the exclusive
cause of action for usury claims against national banks "there is, in short, no
98. Franchise Tax Bd. ofCal., 463 U.S. at 23-24.
99. Id. at 24.
1 00. Beneficial Nat'I Banlc v.Anderson,539 U.S. I (2004).
IOI. Id. at 3-4.
1 02. National Banlc Act, 1 2 U. S.C.§§ 85-86 (2000).
1 03. See Beneficial Nat '/ Bank, 539 U. S. at 4-5 (discussing 28 U. S.C.§ 1441).
1 04. See Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc.,287 F.3d 1 038, 1 048 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2002),rev 'd, 539
U.S. I (2004) (finding no clear congressional intent to permit removal under§§ 85-86 of the
National Banlc Act).
1 05. See Beneficial Nat '/ Bank, 539 U. S. at 1 1 ("In actions against national banks for
usury, [the National Banlc Act] supersede[s] both the substantive and the remedial provisions of
state usury laws and create[ s] a federal remedy for overcharges that is exclusive,even when the
state complaint ... relies entirely on state law.").
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such thing as a state law claim of usury against a national bank" and thus "[t]his
cause of action against national banks only arises under federal law and could,
therefore, be removed under § 1441.11 106
Unfortunately, the Court in Beneficial National Bank provided no more
explanation of this incomprehensible doctrine than it had given on previous
occasions. Although the Court rightly noted that the fact that the National
Bank Act provides defendants with a complete federal preemption defense
"would not justify removal," the Court felt that the preemptive effect was so
absolute and complete so as to give the statute "the requisite pre-emptive force
to provide removal jurisdiction." 107 Of course, this is not an explanation but
simply the Court's own ipse dixit, in effect declaring that because the Bank Act
is really preemptive, preempted state law claims magically turn into removable
federal claims. In his dissent in Beneficial National Bank, Justice Scalia
properly labeled this hocus pocus as "jurisdictional alchemy" that the Court has
never adequately explained or justified. 108 Just because federal law may
preempt a state law claim does not somehow transform the state claim into a
federal one. 109 Rather, the claim is merely a state law claim that is preempted.
Thus, the proper approach in such instances would be to require
defendants to raise their preemption defenses in the state courts in which the
state law claims were brought and permit those state courts to resolve them.
Then, as the United States explained in its amicus brief in Beneficial National
Bank, the state court could either recharacterize the preempted state law claim
as federal, dismiss the claim on preemption grounds, or reject the preemption
defense and find that the state law claim was not preempted. 1 10 In the event of
an erroneous preemption determination, the U.S. Supreme Court would remain
available to review the decision through its certiorari jurisdiction. 1 1 1 By not
1 06. Id. at l l .
1 07. Id.
l 08. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that the majority's view has "scant support in
our precedents and no support whatever in the National Bank Act or any Act of Congress").
1 09. See id. at 18-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven if the Court is correct that the
National Bank Act obliterates entirely any state-created right to relief for usury against a
national bank, that does not explain how or why the claim of such a right is transmogrified into
the claim of a federal right.").
1 1 0. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1 7-18, Beneficial
Nat'! Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-306), 2003 WL 1 098993.
1 1 1 . See 28 U.S.C.§ 1 257 (2000) (granting the U.S. Supreme Court the power to review
judgments of the States' highest courts); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust
of S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 , 1 2 n.1 2 ( 1 983) ("[T)he absence of original jurisdiction does not mean
that there is no federal forum in which a pre-emption defense may be heard. If the state courts
reject a claim offederal pre-emption, that decision may ultimately be reviewed on appeal by this
Court.").
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taking this course, the Court usurped the legitimate jurisdiction of state courts
and worked "an expansion of federal jurisdiction [that] wrest[s] from state
courts the authority to decide questions of pre-emption." 1 1 2 Therein lies the
aspect of the complete preemption doctrine that makes it a manifestation of
anti-federalist procedure: Through complete preemption the Court denies states
the right to hear state law claims in their courts, based not on any express
determination by Congress that such claims are removable to federal court, but
based solely on the Court's fanciful determination that these claims are in
reality not state law claims at all. But unless Congress makes that so through
its legislative authority, the Court cannot simply declare it to be so by judicial
fiat. 1 1 3
3. Expansive Supplemental Jurisdiction
Congress has provided for "supplemental jurisdiction" over claims that by
themselves would not enjoy federal jurisdiction but form part of the same case
or controversy as claims that do qualify for federal jurisdiction asserted in the
same action. Supplemental jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1 367,
which has two main parts. Section l 367(a) contains the grant of supplemental
jurisdiction by stating, inter a/ia:
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction,
the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part ofthe same case or controversy under Article III ofthe
United States Constitution. 1 14
Section 1 367(b) then outlines the instances where supplemental jurisdiction is
unavailable:
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded solely on section 1 332 ofthis title, the district courts shall not have
supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs
against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined
as plaintiffs under Rule 1 9 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as
plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental
112. Beneficial Nat'! Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. l , 19 (2004) ( Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 2 1 ( Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is up to Congress, not the federal courts, to
decide when the risk of state-court error with respect to a matter of federal law becomes so
unbearable as to justify divesting the state courts of authority to decide the federal matter.").
l 14. 28 U.S. C.§ 1367(a) (2000).

ANTI-FEDERALIST PROCEDURE

255

jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1 332 . 1 1 5

Absent from this language is any reference to Rule 23, the rule that
permits parties to sue or be sued as a class. 1 1 6 Nor does the provision refer to
Rule 20, which permits parties to sue or be sued jointly within a single
action. 1 1 7 Prior to the 1990 enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute
the Supreme Court held in Zahn v. International Paper Co. 1 1 8 that in the
context of a class action invoking diversity jurisdiction, every plaintiff must
separately satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement of the diversity
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 1 19 However, a plain reading of the language of
§ 1367(b) permits the conclusion that Congress overturned Zahn because,
although it withholds supplemental jurisdiction from claims asserted by parties
joined under Rule 19 and Rule 24, it makes no mention of claims asserted by
parties joined under Rule 20 or Rule 23. The Supreme Court adopted this
interpretation of § 1367(b) in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. 120
Although opponents of this view suggested that the statute is ambiguous in this
regard and that the legislative history reveals no intention to overrule Zahn, 121
the Court found no ambiguity in the statute and thus rejected any notion that the
statute's legislative history should be consulted. 122 As a result, under the
Court's reading of the statute in Allapattah Services, if there is one class
member asserting a claim worth more than $75,000, § 1367(a) gives federal
courts supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of all fellow class members,
even though their claims may fall below the jurisdictional amount in
controversy.
The Court's reading of the statute is clearly correct, given the fact that
parties joined under Rule 20 and Rule 23 are nowhere denied the benefits of
115. Id. § 1367(b).
116. FED. R. CIV.P. 23.
117 FED. R. CIV. P. 20.
118. Zahn v. Int'! Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973),superseded by statute, Act ofDec. 1,
1990, Pub.L.No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5113.
119. See Zahn, 414 U. S.at 301 ("Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy
the jurisdictional amount.").
120. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2621 (2005) (finding
that§ 1367 confers jurisdiction over claims brought by Rule 23 plaintiffs).
121. See id. at 2625 ("The proponents of the alternative view of§ 1367 insist that the
statute is at least ambiguous and that we should look to other interpretive tools, including the
legislative history of§ 1367, which supposedly demonstrate Congress did not intend§ 1367 to
overrule Zahn.").
122. See id. ("We can reject this argument at the very outset simply because§ 1367 is not
ambiguous.").
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supplemental jurisdiction in the text of § 1367(b). However, Congress made
clear in the House and Senate reports accompanying the legislation that
overturning Zahn was not their intent. 1 23 Because ours is a nation governed by
laws and not legislative committee reports, what matters is the language of the
statute passed by Congress and signed by the President. 124 Thus, the Court was
correct to eschew any reliance on the legislative history and stick with the plain
language of the statute. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the effect
of § 1367(b) as interpreted by the Court is a substantial broadening of the
jurisdiction of federal courts over state law claims. Section 1367(b) as
interpreted by the Court is thus an instance of anti-federalist procedure because
it permits large numbers ofjurisdictionally insufficient non-federal claims to be
heard in federal rather than state court simply by virtue of their relation to a
jurisdictionally sufficient related state law claim.
D. Federal Review ofState Judicial Determinations

The final variant of anti-federalist procedure comes in the form of federal
review of state judicial determinations. Movement in an anti-federalist
direction in this area has occurred on several fronts. In the area of punitive
damages, the Supreme Court has constitutionalized the issue of the magnitude
of punitive damages awards, enabling the Court to review and strike down
punitive awards coming out of state courts. 125 In the 2000 Presidential election,
Bush v. Gore126 saw the Court intervening in Florida's electoral process to
reverse the determination of that state's courts regarding the need for a recount.
In 2005, Congress intervened in a Florida right-to-die case by creating special
federal jurisdiction that empowered the federal courts to review the
determinations of state courts on the matter. 127 What connects these three
1 23. H.R. REP. No. 1 0 1 -734, at 2 8-29 ( 1 990) ("The section is not intended to affect the
jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1 332 in diversity-only class actions, as those
requirements were interpreted prior to Finley." (citing Supreme Tribe ofBen-Hur v. Cauble, 255
U.S. 356 ( 1 92 1 ) and Zahn v. Int'! Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 ( 1973))).
124. See ANTONCN SCALIA, A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION 1 7 ( 1 997) ("It is the law that
governs, not the intent of the lawgiver . . . . Men may intend what they will; but it is only the
laws that they enact which bind us.").
1 25. See BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 5 1 7 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) (imposing Due Process
limitations on punitive damages awards).
126. See Bush v. Gore, 53 1 U.S. 98, 1 06 (2000) (determining the Florida Supreme Court's
order for a manual recount without any other guidance to be an inadequate remedy).
1 27. See Reliefofthe Parents ofTheresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 1 09-3, § I , 1 1 9 Stat.
15, 15 (2005) (grantingjurisdiction to a Florida federal district court to hear a claim brought by
Theresa Marie Schiavo's parents).
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efforts is the willingness of the Court and Congress to engage in selective,
robust federal review of matters that ordinarily should be treated as having been
conclusively resolved by the state courts-intervention motivated largely by the
perceived unfavorable results generated by the state courts. Each of these
examples will be reviewed in tum.
I. Due Process Remittitur

In BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, 128 the Supreme Court invested
itself with the authority to review punitive damages awards imposed in state
courts for "excessiveness" based on standards derived from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Court wrote, "The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a
' grossly excessive' punishment on a tortfeasor." 129 Excessiveness, the Court
announced, was to be determined with reference to three "guideposts": "the
degree of reprehensibility of the [challenged conduct]; the disparity between the
harm or potential harm suffered . . . and [the] punitive damages award; and the
difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases." 1 30 The Court subsequently declared that "the level of
punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury," opening the door for
the Court's utilization of a de nova standard of review for jury-imposed
punitive damages awards. 1 3 1 More recently, the Court added, "[l]n practice,
few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." 1 32
The result of this series of Court opinions is that state courts are no longer
the sole authorities over what level ofpunishment is appropriate for tortfeasors
who violate state law. If the Supreme Court feels that the amount is too high
because of its view that the offending conduct was insufficiently reprehensible,
the Court may simply strike down the award. Of course, this doctrine then
enables the Supreme Court to substitute its own judgment of reprehensibility
for those of state legislatures and juries, something it has no right to do.
128. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
129. Id. at 562 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 454
(1993)).
130. Id. at 575.
131. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U. S. 424, 437 (2001)
(quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 459 (1996) ( Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
132. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408, 425 (2003).
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Although it invokes the Due Process Clause as justification for this intrusion on
state sovereign authority, as I have discussed in a previous article, there is no
substantive due process protection against punitive damages beyond a certain
level. 133 Federal excessiveness jurisprudence is thus not only an anti-federalist
imposition on state prerogatives; it is illegitimate in its foundation on phony
due process principles.
2. Bush v. Gore
Bush v. Gore 134 provides another notable instance of federal review of

state judicial determinations. Article II, § l of the U.S. Constitution provides:
"Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereofmay direct,
a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress." 135 This
provision unambiguously makes it the exclusive province of states to
determine--through their regularly constituted and constrained legislatures
the "Manner" of appointing presidential Electors. Indeed, the Court has
affirmed that the authority of states in this sphere is "plenary. " 136 However,
once a state decides to allow its electorate to vote for the state's electors, that
state may not arbitrarily treat the votes cast in a disparate manner. 137 The
central issue in Bush v. Gore was whether Florida transgressed this principle in
ordering manual recounts of votes cast to determine "the intent of the voter."138
The majority in Bush v. Gore held that largely because the standards for
determining voter intent might differ from one county to the next or even
within counties, the recount plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 139

133. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process & Punitive Damages: The E"or ofFederal
Excessiveness Review, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 1085, 1088 (2006) ("What history and precedent
indicate is that due process has never been construed to impair the common law practice of
states permitting civil juries to award exemplary damages at levels they deem appropriate under
the circumstances.").
134. Bush v. Gore, 53 l U.S. 98 (2000).
135. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ l .
136. See McPherson v. Blacker, 1 46 U.S. I, 35 ( l892) (deciding that the Constitution gives
States the plenary power to decide how to choose their presidential electors).
1 37. See Harper v. Va. Bd. ofElections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 ( l 966) ("[O]nce the franchise is
granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
138. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1 05-06.
139. See id. at l 06 (stating that voter intent standards would not be uniform throughout the
state and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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Although the propriety of such an application of the Equal Protection
Clause can be and has been debated,140 of more importance to our exploration
of anti-federalist procedure was the Court's further determination that Florida
would not be given the opportunity to design and implement a recount process
that would alleviate these equal protection concerns. Finding that "[t]he
Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended the State's
electors to 'participat[e] fully in the federal electoral process,' as provided in 3
U.S.C. § 5," 141 and finding that a constitutional recount could not possibly be
concluded by the December 12 "safe harbor"142 date established by 3 U.S.C.
§ 5, the Court simply reversed the Florida Supreme Court's judgment that a
recount proceed.143
Two things were remarkable about the Court's decision not to permit
Florida to develop a constitutionally sound recount scheme. First, the Court's
basis for doing so was thin; although the Court claimed that the Supreme Court
of Florida had announced a legislative intent that Florida's "electors"
"participat[e] fully in the federal electoral process," the Florida high court said
no such thing. Instead, here is what the Florida court said:
[I] n this case involving a presidential election, we conclude that the
reasoned basis for the exercise of the Department's discretion to ignore
amended returns is limited to those instances where failure to ignore the
amended returns will: . . . in the case of a federal election, will result in
Florida voters not partici/.!ating fully in the federal electoral process, as
provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5. 44
Florida's Supreme Court was speaking here about the discretionary rejection of
amended returns in a federal election and laying down the rule that such
discretion is appropriately exercised if the failure to do so would prevent voters
(not "electors") from participating in the federal electoral process. Reference to
140. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheersfor Bush v. Gore, 68 U.
CHI. L. REv. 657, 673-74 (200 l ) (defending Bush v. Gore's Equal Protection Clause holding);
David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 737, 749-51
(2001) (criticizing Bush v. Gore's Equal Protection Clause holding); Cass R. Sunstein, Order
Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 758 (2001) ("[T]he Court's rationale was not only
exceedingly ambitious but also embarrassingly weak. However appealing, its equal protection
holding had no basis in precedent or in history.").
1 41. Bush v. Gore, 53 l U.S. 98, I I O (2000) (quoting Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd.
v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1289 (Fla. 2000)); see 3 U.S.C.§ 5 (2000) (providing that ifa state
legislature has provided for the final determination of contests or controversies by law, that
determination shall be conclusive if made at least six days prior to the meeting of electors).
142. Bush, 531 U.S. at I I 0.
143. Id.
144. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1289 (Fla. 2000).
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3 U.S.C. § 5 is made in order to indicate that the deadlines contained therein
must be taken into account when deciding whether to ignore amended
retums. 1 45 Nothing in this statement commits the State of Florida to an
unyielding policy of submitting a slate of electors by the deadline imposed by 3
U.S.C. § 5. Rather, the Florida court was speaking only of the propriety of
rejecting amended returns in an effort to meet that deadline. For the U.S.
Supreme Court to misuse this statement by the Supreme Court of Florida as its
sole basis for cutting off the recount was disingenuous.
This brings us to the second difficulty with the Court's decision to
preclude Florida from proceeding with a recount under a revised scheme: The
U.S. Supreme Court completely usurped Florida's exclusive and plenary power
over the appointment of electors as promised by Article II, § 1 of the U.S.
Constitution. Florida has determined that its voters will select presidential
electors and that in counting the votes of the electorate "the intent of the voter"
must be determined, 146 a mandate that the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged
was "unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and a starting principle." 1 47
Beyond the obligation to comply with the mandates of the Equal Protection
Clause and other pertinent constitutional constraints, Florida, not the U.S.
Supreme Court, is empowered to design, administer, and implement whatever
process for selecting presidential electors it sees fit to pursue. It was for Florida
to determine whether the votes of its voters had been properly and fully counted
in the election of its electors, and if the state was going to miss the safe harbor
deadline of 3 U.S.C. § 5 to make that determination, that was their prerogative.
Missing the deadline is not unprecedented 148 and only deprives the state of
having its slate of electors treated as "conclusive." 1 49 In favoring manual
recounts, it appears that Florida had prioritized making sure that every vote was
properly counted above receiving safe harbor protection for its electors.
The problem is that the U.S. Supreme Court reached its own judgment
regarding Florida's policy in this regard, contriving a non-existent Florida
145. See id. ("However, in this case involving a presidential election, the decision as to
when amended returns can be excluded from the statewide certification must necessarily be
considered in conjunction with the contest provisions of section l 02.168 and the deadlines set
forth in 3 U.S.C. § 5.").
146. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1256 (Fla. 2000) (explaining that state legislation
requires a legal vote to represent a voter's intent), rev 'd, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
147. Bush, 531 U.S. at 106.
148. See id. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]n 1960, Hawaii appointed two slates of
electors and Congress chose to count the one appointed on January 4, 1961, well after the Title
3 deadlines." (citing William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22
J. LEGIS. 145, 166 n.154 (1996))).
149. 3 u.s.c. § 5 (2000).
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legislative intent to meet the safe harbor deadline at all costs and purporting to
render its decision in deference to that intent. The anti-federalist aspects of the
process now become clear. Constitutionally, the procedure for selecting
electors is the exclusive province of the states, as is the procedure for resolving
controversies surrounding their selection. 150 Establishing the selection process
is a state legislative concern as is establishing the process for resolving election
controversies. The actual resolution of those controversies, to the extent they
tum on issues of state electoral law, is ultimately for a state's judiciary. The
Supreme Court's intervention into this sphere, not to enforce federal
constitutional guarantees, but rather to pronounce Florida policy respecting the
selection of electors and to bring an end to a process that Florida had
determined should continue, deprived Florida of its constitutional power to
"appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors." 1 5 1 In doing so, the Court deprived Florida of an express power
granted to it under the Constitution, arrogated that power unto itself,
transgressed the principle oflimited federal government, and trammeled on the
right of states to resolve conclusively issues of state law, all in one fell swoop.
What prompted the Court's failure to defer to Florida's interpretation and
application of its own laws? Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a separate concurring
opinion stated, "Though we generally defer to state courts on the interpretation
of state law, there are of course areas in which the Constitution requires this
Court to undertake an independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law." 1 52
This was one of those areas, Rehnquist explained, because "[a] significant
departure from the legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors
presents a federal constitutional question" 153 and the question before the Court
was whether the Supreme Court of Florida's judgment represented an
impermissible departure from Florida's selection scheme. The Court concluded
that it did. 1 54 More explanatory may be one commentator's analysis: "[T]his
Court found the national interests at stake-what it perceived as the fairness
and reliability of the presidential election result-more compelling than

1 50. Bush v. Gore, 53 1 U.S. 98, 1 1 3 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("Art. 11, § 1 , cl.
2 'convey[s] the broadest power ofdetermination' and 'leaves it to the legislature exclusively to
define the method' of appointment." (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 1 46 U.S. 1 , 8 ( 1 892))).
1 5 1 . U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 .
1 52. Bush, 53 1 U.S. at 1 14 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted).
1 53. Id. at 1 1 3 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
1 54. See id. at 1 20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("For the court to step away from this
established practice, prescribed by the Secretary [of State] . . . was to depart from the legislative
scheme.").
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Florida's sovereignty interest in resolving its own election controversy." 1 55 In
other words, it was more important-in the Court's view-to bring the
presidential election to a secure conclusion than the chaos that would have
ensued were Florida's authority respected and its recount permitted to go
forward.
Although the validity of the Court's conclusion that the recount would
impermissibly depart from Florida's electoral scheme constituted a significant
aspect of the decision, the remedy the Court selected-reversal of the Florida
Supreme Court's decision and the cutting off of any recounts-is what makes
the Court's decision fundamentally anti-federalist. As was done in the Court's
per curiam majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence relied
upon the strained notion that the Florida legislature had made taking advantage
of the safe harbor provided by 3 U.S. C. § 5 an absolute priority that constrained
any efforts state courts might undertake in resolving electoral controversies. 1 56
As discussed earlier, that this was actually the position of the Florida legislature
is not something that the Court convincingly established. Nor was it something
for the U.S. Supreme Court to declare. True respect for the constitutional
authority of Florida's legislature to select electors, and of the authority of
Florida's courts to adjudicate ensuing disputes would have demanded a remand
to the Supreme Court of Florida to enable it to determine whether the
legislature did indeed prioritize meeting the safe harbor deadline over verifying
a proper count of votes and to fashion a constitutionally acceptable recount
procedure if necessary, the impending passage of the safe harbor deadline
notwithstanding. As the Court ironically noted in its per curiam opinion, "The
press of time does not diminish the constitutional concern. A desire for speed
is not a general excuse for ignoring equal protection guarantees. " 1 57 Neither
should the press of time have motivated the Court to usurp Florida's
constitutional entitlement to control the selection ofits presidential electors and
determine its legislative intent for itself.

1 55. Bradley W. Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism, and the Distrust of Politics, 62
Omo ST. L.J. 1 78 1 , 1804 (2001 ).
1 56. See Bush v. Gore, 53 1 U.S. 98, 1 20-2 1 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("The
scope and nature of the remedy ordered by the Florida Supreme Court jeopardizes the legislative
wish to take advantage of the safe harbor provided by 3 U.S.C. § 5.") (citations omitted); see
also id. at 1 2 1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("Surely when the Florida Legislature empowered
the courts of the State to grant 'appropriate' relief, it must have meant relief that would have
become final by the cutoff date of 3 U.S.C. § 5.").
1 57. Id. at 1 08.
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3. The Case of Terri Schiavo

On March 21, 2005 Congress enacted legislation entitled "Relief of the
Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo" (Terri's Law). 1 58 The Act was in response
to decisions by Florida state courts that Ms. Schiavo was in a persistent
vegetative state and that she would have elected to forego further use of a
feeding tube. 1 59 Terri's Law conferred jurisdiction over any federal claims
pertaining to the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment, foods or
fluids from Ms. Schiavo to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. 1 60 Terri's Law also granted standing to the parents of Ms.
Schiavo to bring suit
against any other person who was a party to State court proceedings
relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical
treatment necessary to sustain the life of Theresa Marie Schiavo, or who
may act pursuant to a State court order authorizing or directing the
withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary
to sustain her life. 161

Pursuant to this Act, Ms. Schiavo's parents filed suit in Florida federal court,
seeking a temporary restraining order directing Ms. Schiavo's guardian and the
hospice where she was located to transport her to a hospital for medical
treatment. 162 Both the district court 163 and the Eleventh Circuit 164 rejected the
parents' request for a temporary restraining order and the Supreme Court
declined to intervene. 165
The anti-federalist attributes of Terri's Law are obvious. Florida's
determination regarding Ms. Schiavo's medical condition and her wishes
regarding death were matters of Florida state law that had been conclusively
resolved by Florida's courts. Nevertheless, because Congress and the President
disagreed with the decision made by the courts, they took the extraordinary step
1 58. Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 1 09-3, 1 1 9 Stat. 15
(2005).
1 59. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 9 1 6 So. 2d 8 1 4, 8 1 9 (Fla. App. 2005) (upholding
the lower court's decision to terminate life-sustaining procedures).
1 60. Reliefofthe Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo § I , 1 1 9 Stat. at 15.
1 6 1 . Id. § 2 , 1 1 9 Stat. at 1 5 .
1 62. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 6 1 , 1 1 63-64 (M.D. Fla.
2005) (deciding that the plaintiffs had not established the necessary elements for granting a
temporary restraining order).
1 63. Id. at 1 1 68.
1 64. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F. 3d 1 289, 1303 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2005).
1 65. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 544 U.S. 945 (2005) (denying the petition
for writ of certiorari).
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of enacting legislation on behalf of one individual to provide a federal forum
for challenging compliance with the state courts' decrees. Ordinarily, under the
so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 166 lower federal courts have no jurisdiction
over "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments." 167 Such appellate jurisdiction is limited to the U.S. Supreme
Court. 168 Terri's Law nullified this doctrine but only for one special case. In
doing so, the Act's proponents clearly violated principles of federalism that
many of them otherwise held dear. 169
III. Analysis & Critique

Although many of the demerits of anti-federalist procedure have already
been alluded to, this Part undertakes a more comprehensive analysis of the
deeper issues raised by this phenomenon. The critique will be fivefold. First,
to the extent that Congress has relied upon its authority under the Commerce
Clause to interfere with state judicial prerogatives as described above, such
reliance has been misplaced. Neither the clause itself nor the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence provides Congress with any authority to limit
the award of punitive damages by state courts, to require the application ofRule
11 in state court, or to determine intrastate venue in personal injury cases tried
in state court. Second, the Guarantee Clause-a provision written offby many,
including the Supreme Court, as moribund-should be read to preclude the
1 66. The name for this doctrine is drawn from Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 261 U.S. 1 14
( 1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
167. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,544 U. S. 280,284 (2005).
168. See 28 U.S.C.§ 1257 (2000) ( "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had may be reviewed by the Supreme Court.").
169. David Davenport of the Hoover Institute criticized Terri's Law by stating:
When a case like this has been heard by 19 judges in six courts and it's been
appealed to the Supreme Court three times, the process has worked-even if it
hasn't given the result that the social conservatives want. For Congress to step in
really is a violation of federalism.
Adam Nagoumey, G.O.P. Right Is Splintered on Schiavo Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2005, at A l 4,available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/23/politics/23repubs.html?ei=5088
&en=37017363 1523358 1 &ex= l 269234000&partner=rssnyt&pagewanted=print&position=.
Stephen Moore,president of the Free Enterprise Fund,was quoted in the same article as having
said, "I don't normally like to see the federal government intervening in a situation like this,
which I think should be resolved ultimately by the family: I think states' rights should take
precedence over federal intervention. A lot of conservatives are really struggling with this
case." Id.
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degree of interference with state judiciaries contemplated by anti-federalist
legislation. Third, principles offederalism enshrined in the Tenth Amendment
cast doubt on the validity of the federal imposition on state judiciaries via the
congressional enactments and Court decisions described above. Fourth,
expansive grants of federal jurisdiction and interpretations of federal
jurisdictional statutes run afoul of the limitations set forth in Article III by
empowering federal courts to hear cases the Constitution neglects to place
within their authority. Finally, this Part will challenge the doctrinal consistency
of the proponents of anti-federalist procedure, highlighting their tendency to
support principles offederalism and states' rights in most instances but forsake
those principles in the procedural areas reviewed above.
A. A Misuse of the Commerce Clause Power

Current understandings of the Commerce Clause preclude congressional
efforts to constrain the authority of state courts to impose punitive damages
awards in state law cases. 1 70 Modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence permits
Congress to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, and activities that "substantially affect" 1 7 1 interstate
commerce. 1 72 State courts are not "channels" or "instrumentalities" of interstate
commerce and thus can only be regulated if their activity falls under the third
170. Professor Bellia has previously addressed the question of the propriety of regulating
state court procedures under the Commerce Clause but his answer was ultimately too equivocal
and unsatisfactory:
[The] constitutionality [of the Y2K Act's regulation of state court procedure] thus
may depend on whether the Commerce Clause permits only direct regulation of
economic activity or regulation of noneconomic activity that has substantial
economic effects. Until that question is resolved, Congress's authority to regulate
state court procedures under Article I remains open to question.
Bellia, supra note 9, at 970.
171. Although the Court has not shirked from the notion that activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce may be reached under the Commerce Clause, it is worth noting that
this strain of the doctrine arguably stretches the clause beyond its originally understood
meaning. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("[Tihe very notion of a 'substantial effects' test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent
with the original understanding of Congress' powers and with this Court's early Commerce
Clause cases."). Although challenging this aspect of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is beyond
the scope of this article, the contested validity of the substantial effects test should caution
against expansive applications of the doctrine to permit the regulation ofnon-economic activity
traditionally falling within the states' spheres of authority.
172. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (reiterating the rule that "Congress has
the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce").
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category-referred to as the "substantial effects" test. But the Court has thus
far confined congressional authority to regulate activity under this test to
"economic" activity, 1 73 a characterization one cannot fairly ascribe to the
adjudication of claims by state courts. Although the outcomes of state court
adjudication of commercial disputes may substantially affect interstate
commerce, the adjudication of claims in and of itself does not constitute
economic activity. Rather, state court adjudication is quintessential
governmental activity-the operation of the state's official mechanism for
hearing and resolving claims seeking redress for violation of state laws. States
open their courts to the resolution of disputes not as a business enterprise, but
as a fundamental component of the exercise of their law enforcement authority
within their respective jurisdictions. Labeling such activity "economic" is a
stretch at best.
Congressional attempts to regulate state punitive damages awards run into
further difficulty because they purport to regulate an area within the traditional
sphere of state authority. The Court has noted that activity cannot be regulated
under the Commerce Clause solely based on the activity's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce when the activity falls within areas of traditional state
regulation. 1 74 This limitation is meant to prevent Congress from exercising, via
the Commerce Clause, a plenary police power of the kind that has been
reserved to the states. 1 75 As the Court explained in United States v.
Morrison, 1 76 permitting violent crimes against women to be regulated based on
their aggregate effects on interstate commerce "will not limit Congress to
1 73. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 6 1 3 ("While we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in
our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity
only where that activity is economic in nature."). Speaking of its decision in Morrison, the
Raich Court explained:
Despite congressional findings that such crimes had an adverse impact on interstate
commerce, we held the [Violence Against Women Act] unconstitutional because,
like the statute in Lopez, it did not regulate economic activity. We concluded that
"the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our
decision in Lopez . . . . "
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added) (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 6 1 0).
1 74. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 6 1 5-1 6 ("Petitioners' reasoning, moreover, will not limit
Congress to regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as well to
family law and other areas oftraditional state regulation since the aggregate effect ofmarriage,
divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant."); id at 6 1 7 ("We
accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal
conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce.").
1 75. See United States v. Lopez, 5 1 4 U.S. 549, 566 ( 1 995) ("The Constitution . . .
withhold(s] from Congress a plenary police power.").
1 76. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as
well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the
aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy
is undoubtedly significant." 177 Because "the Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local," 1 78 such interference with
traditional state bailiwicks based on their inevitable aggregate effects on
interstate commerce cannot be permitted consistent with the notion of a
national government of limited powers.
The fixing and award of punitive damages for judgments on state law
claims tried in state courts has always been the province of the states, 1 79
rendering congressional attempts to regulate in this area improper under the
Commerce Clause. As I have explained elsewhere, states have always enjoyed
a pre-constitutional right to empower juries to impose punitive damages as they
see fit, and this power was not yielded to the federal government in the
Constitution. 180 Thus, Congress's efforts to use its Commerce Clause authority
to limit the remedies that state courts can provide for the vindication of state
law claims trample on states' exercise of a reserved power and usurps the
states' exercise of their police powers, substituting a federal police power in its
place. The Commerce Clause does not now nor was it ever intended to permit
Congress to control remedies available under state law in state courts. The
Supreme Court has written that the Commerce Clause "authorizes Congress to
regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate
state governments' regulation of interstate commerce." 181 This principle
applies with equal force to state courts: The Commerce Clause does not
authorize Congress to regulate state governments' adjudication of commercial
disputes based on state law, 182 a process that is part and parcel of a state's
exercise of its police power. In sum, regulating non-economic activity (state
court adjudication), in an area of traditional state regulation (punitive damages
for state law claims), by regulating courts rather than economic actors
themselves-all based on the idea that such adjudications substantially affect
interstate commerce-is a few bridges too far.
177. Id.at 615-l6.
178. Id. at 617-l8.
179. See Spencer, supra note 133,at 1125 ("[I]t is clear that states traditionally have been
unconstrained in their ability to award punitive damages.").
180. Id.
181. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
182. See Bellia,supra note 9, at 966 ("Historically, even the most contested exercises of
the commerce power have operated directly upon the primary economic activity of individuals
rather than upon how disputes arising from that economic activity are litigated.").
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The same analysis applies to the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act's
command that state courts apply Rule 1 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to state court proceedings in all cases where they determine that the
action would "substantially affect[] interstate commerce." 1 83 Although this
language attempts to exploit the substantial effects test as a hook for Congress's
regulation of state court procedure in this regard, as discussed above, Congress
may not regulate the operation of state courts under the Commerce Clause
because state court adjudication of state law claims is a non-economic activity
within the traditional sphere of authority retained by the states. 184 Congress
certainly can legislate in areas of interstate commerce and provide for exclusive
federal court jurisdiction over disputes involving those matters, in which case
the federal rules of civil procedure could properly be applied; however,
Congress can hardly claim the authority to require that states follow the federal
procedural rules when adjudicating state law claims in their own courts.
B. Violation of the Guarantee Clause

Article IV, § 4 of the United States Constitution provides: "The United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government . . . . " 185 There are two sides to the Guarantee Clause: 186 a
limitation on states and a limitation on the federal government. States are
183. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 1 09th Cong. § 3 ( 1 st Sess. 2005).
184. See supra Part II.A (discussing instances in which state courts have been ousted of
their jurisdiction over certain common law tort claims).
185. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
186. It should be noted at the outset that the Court has long viewed claims based on the
Guarantee Clause as nonjusticiable. See New York, 505 U.S. at 184 ("In most of the cases in
which the Court has been asked to apply the Clause, the Court has found the claims presented to
be non justiciable under the 'political question' doctrine."). Thus, the vision of the Guarantee
Clause propounded herein would have to "overcome deeply held notions that the Clause is
nonjusticiable." Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A
New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. Cow. L. REv. 8 1 5, 822 ( 1 994). As Professor
Richard Fallon recently pointed out, the possibility of a relaxation of the Court's absolute
nonjusticiability position is not far-fetched:
Several prominent Supreme Court decisions have held that Guarantee Clause cases
present nonjusticiable political questions. In New York [v. United States, 505 U.S.
1 44 ( 1 992)] however, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion signaled a potential
willingness to consider whether the reach of those decisions should be limited . . . .
Although inconclusive, this discussion held out the plain possibility that the Court
might treat some Guarantee Clause claims as justiciable in the future, even if it
adhered to the view that others are not.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 1 1 9
HARV. L. REv. 1274, 1308 n. 1 58 (2006) (citations omitted).
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required, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to vest power in the people to
select and control their rulers . 1 87 More importantly for our purposes is the
admonition the clause gives to the federal government: The federal
government may not interfere with states' autonomy to such an extent that it
prevents them from enjoying "untrammeled self-government." I 88 This notion
derives from the fact that undue interference with state autonomy eviscerates
popular sovereignty, supplanting republican self-governance by the people with
federal control of state authorities. It cannot be gainsaid that "a separate and
independent judiciary is an indispensable element of a republican form of
government" 189 and thus state courts must properly be regarded as an essential
piece of the republican form protected by the clause. In light of these
principles, congressional enactments that either directly control state courts or
that eliminate their ability to adjudicate state law claims pursuant to their
respective charters of authority offend republicanism in a way the Guarantee
Clause should be seen as competent to prevent.
The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act would have crossed this line. The bill
called for the application of Rule 1 1 to state court proceedings that
"substantially affect[] interstate commerce" 190 and also mandated that personal
injury claims filed in state court be filed in the state and county in which either
of the parties resides or where the injury occurred. 191 Both of these provisions
transgress the Guarantee Clause because the federal prescription of civil
procedure for state courts would prevent states from prescribing such procedure
themselves. Because promulgating its own judicial procedure is an ordinary
function of state government, the Guarantee Clause bars the federal government
from taking this power out of the hands of state citizens and arrogating it unto
itself. 192 When states cannot control their own judicial procedure, the people
1 87. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1 , 23 ( 1 988) ("[A] republican government is one in

which the people control their rulers. That control, moreover, is exerted principally--although
not exclusively-through majoritarian processes.").
188. WILLIAM WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OFTIIE U.S. CONSTITIJTION 294 ( 1 972); see
Merritt, supra note 187, at 22-23 ("[l)n the guarantee clause the United States promises to
secure each of the states the autonomy necessary to maintain a republican form of government.
The guarantee clause, therefore, provides an essential constitutional limit on federal interference
with state autonomy.").
189. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 , 588 (3d Cir. 1966) (en bane), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1 02 1 ( 1 967); see County of Lane v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 7 1 , 76 ( 1869) (indicating that
states are "endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence").
1 90. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 1 09th Cong.§ 3 ( 1 st Sess. 2005).
1 9 1 . Id. § 4.
1 92. Cf United States v. Downey, 195 F. Supp. 581 , 585 (S.D. Ill. 1961) (holding that the
federal government cannot promulgate rules for criminal procedure in the State courts because
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no longer control the judicial arm oftheir respective state governments; instead,
the federal government controls the state judiciary, meaning that republicanism
no longer prevails. Such a state of affairs would transform state governments
from sovereign republican entities into subordinate administrative units of the
central national government. The conversion of states into administrative
subordinates or mere colonial outposts of the federal government must be
viewed as an outcome that the Guarantee Clause cannot tolerate. When the
states are relegated to subordinate units or instrumentalities of the federal
government to be commandeered and directed according to the federal will,
particularly with respect to matters reserved to state control, they are stripped of
their autonomy and are prevented from maintaining and operating the
government of laws instituted by their respective citizenries.
The affront to the Guarantee Clause imposed by the Class Action Fairness
Act is more tentative and subtle. Although CAPA operates to enlarge the
diversity jurisdiction of federal courts to embrace the filing and removal of
certain putative class actions, the practical result ofCAFA will most likely not
simply be the litigation of certain class actions in federal versus state court;
rather, some if not many of the cases that otherwise would have been litigated
as class actions in state court will face more challenging class certification
standards that will prevent the cases from moving forward at all. 193 That this
might occur was Congress's stated expectation in its report supporting the
doing so would "disregard the provisions of [the Guarantee Clause]," which precludes the
federal government from "prevent[ing] a state from discharging its ordinary functions of
government").
1 93 . The more stringent class certification and settlement standards imposed by the
Supreme Court in cases like Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 52 l U.S. 591 (1 997), and Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 8 1 5 ( 1 999), particularly with respect to the predominance
requirement for damages classes, will likely stymie more putative class actions removed to
federal court than would be the case were those cases to remain in state courts. See Morrison,
supra note 60, at 1 522 ("[U]nderlying the arguments about whether these cases 'ought' to be in
state or federal court is a deeply held belief by each side that the choice of forum will
significantly affect the outcome ofthe case."). Congress recognized the heightened scrutiny of
class certifications by federal judges in its committee report accompanying CAFA:
The Committee finds, however, that one reason for the dramatic explosion of class
actions in state courts is that some state court judges are less careful than their
federal court counterparts about applying the procedural requirements that govern
class actions. In particular, many state court judges are lax about following the
strict requirements of Rule 23 (or the state's parallel governing rule), which are
intended to protect the due process rights of both unnamed class members and
defendants. In contrast, federal courts generally scrutinize proposed settlements
much more carefully and pay closer attention to the procedural requirements for
certifying a matter for class treatment.
S. REP. No. 1 09- 1 4, at 14 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 1 4.
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legislation. 194 To the extent that state law class actions are removed to federal
court under CAFA and decertified, state courts are robbed of the opportunity to
adjudicate claims that might have vindicated important state law interests and
possible transgressions of state law go unchallenged. In effect, then, CAFA in
these instances will nullify state law by neutering the ability of state courts to
enforce violations thereof and by moving them into a federal forum only to be
dismissed, a process I refer to as "CAFA nullification."
The essence of a republican form of government "is the right of the people
to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their
own laws." 195 When the state judiciary-the arm of government responsible for
interpreting and applying popularly authorized state laws-effectively loses the
ability to adjudicate claims arising under state law through CAFA nullification,
the state no longer retains control over the just administration of its laws.
Because Article III expressly extends the federal judicial power to cases
described in CAFA, this usurpation in and of itself cannot be the source of
complaint. The problem is federal courts' application of stringent federal
certification standards to decertify and dismiss removed class actions that
would have been permitted to proceed in state court. The result in such
circumstances is that the will of the people (expressed through their duly
selected state officials) to provide a state law right and state judicial remedy is
nullified and self-governance dies. Not only does CAFA nullification
undermine republicanism, it compromises the rule oflaw by stripping states of
the ability to enforce the law in certain instances and it interferes with the right
of citizens to petition their respective state governments for the redress of
grievances. 196
C. An Affront to Federalism

Our Constitution creates a federal system in which the original sovereignty
of the states is retained to the extent it has not been surrendered to the national
government expressly. The vision of the Framers, as expressed by James
Madison, was that " [t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
1 94. See id. at 64 ("The only thing that would be denied when an interstate class action is
removed to federal court is the plaintiffs' lawyers' ability to strike it rich on class actions that
should not be certified by any court because they do not meet the requirements of a proper
class.").
1 95. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 46 1 ( 189 1 ).
1 96. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of
the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
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State governments are numerous and indefinite." 1 97 The limited government
thus described was assured via the adoption of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments to the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment provides, "The
enumeration in the Constitution, ofcertain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." 1 98 The Tenth Amendment
provides, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." 1 99 As I have written elsewhere:
Together, the Ninth Amendment, which guards "against a latitude of
interpretation," and the Tenth Amendment, which "exclud[es] every source
of power not within the constitution itself," combine to impose a "federalist
rule of constitutional construction" that bars any interpretation of the
Constitution that either infringes upon rights retained by the peo£le or
arrogates to the national government power reserved to the states.2

The Tenth Amendment in particular, which makes the states all powerful in
areas where they have not ceded authority to the federal government, is a major
bulwark against federal incursions into the sphere of authority intended to be
confined to the states. Thus, the Court has emphasized that "judicial
enforcement of the Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal
system so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the
Constitution. 11201
Congress's misuse of the Commerce Clause to regulate state courts
directly is a clear violation of the Tenth Arnendment. 202 Once it is
acknowledged that the substantial effects test does not permit Congress to
require application ofRule 1 1 in state courts or to determine venue within state
judicial systems, no other provision remains as a source for such regulation,
1 97 . THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1
Cranch) 1 3 7 , 1 7 6 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The powers of the legislature are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.").
1 98. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
1 99. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
200. Spencer, supra note 1 33, at 1 1 40 (citations omitted).
201 . Garcia v . San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 570 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
202. Professor Tribe made a similar comment with respect to the proposed National
Tobacco Settlement. A Review of the Global Tobacco Settlement: Hearing before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 05th Cong. 1 60 (1997) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe) ("For
Congress directly to regulate the procedures used by state courts in adjudicating state law tort
claims---to forbid them, for example, from applying their generally applicable class action
procedures in cases involving tobacco suits-would raise serious questions under the Tenth
Amendment and principles of federalism.").
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which indicates that the regulation ofstate judicial procedure hearing state law
claims was a matter reserved to the states.203 Because states retain authority
over their respective judiciaries under the Tenth Amendment, the Court has
indicated that "the procedure by which rights may be enforced and wrongs
remedied is peculiarly a subject of state regulation and control. "204 Clearly,
then, ifCongress cannot control state judicial procedure through the Commerce
Clause, the Tenth Amendment makes such efforts unconstitutional.
Similarly, Congress's attempts to limit punitive damages awards-an
effort not sanctioned by the Commerce Clause-transgress the reserved
authority ofstates to control the remedies to be available for violations oftheir
laws. As the Supreme Court remarked long ago, "There can, ofcourse, be no
doubt of the general principle that matters respecting the remedy . . . depend
upon the law ofthe place where the suit is brought.11205 States have traditionally
controlled punitive damages awards on state law claims heard in their courts,
making congressional limitations of this non-economic activity a non-starter
under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence and thus unconstitutional per
the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court's attempt to limit punitive
damages via the Due Process Clause fares no better; as I have explained in a
previous writing:
By interpreting the Due Process Clause in a manner that co-opts the
authority of state j uries to determine the appropriate level of punitive
damages and instead permits the U.S. Supreme Court to do so, the Court
has engaged in precisely the expansive and aggrandizing constitutional
interpretation prohibited by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. 206

Neither Congress nor the Court, then, can limit the availability or amount of
punitive damages in state law cases consistent with the mandate of the Tenth
Amendment.
The Court's implied preemption doctrine contravenes the Tenth
Amendment as well because the doctrine empowers the Court to declare that
a statute preempts state law notwithstanding the absence of a congressional
mandate to that effect. Congress unquestionably has the power to legislate in
203. See Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 3 1 1 , 315 (1843) ("[U]ndoubtedly, a state
may regulate at pleasure the modes of proceeding in its courts . . . .").
204. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 1 5 1 , 1 58 ( 1 93 1 ); see
also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State andFederal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489,
508 (1954) ("The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of
state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them."), quoted in
Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 9 1 1 , 9 1 9 (1997); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990).
205. Cent. Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511 ( 1 9 1 4) (citations omitted).
206. Spencer, supra note 133, at 1 1 42.

274

64 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 233 (2007)

areas within its constitutional grant of authority and direct that such
enactments preempt relevant state law. However, the Court lacks this
authority; thus, when it reads preemption into a statute where Congress has
not expressly provided for it or expressed its intention that there be
preemption, the Court illegitimately nullifies state laws and judicial
procedures meant to be protected by the Tenth Amendment . Further, the
Court has endorsed a presumption ofconcurrent federal and state jurisdiction,
rebuttable only "by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable
implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between
state-court jurisdiction and federal interests. 11 207 The Court's implied
preemption jurisprudence goes against this notion, reaching out to invalidate
state jurisdiction without the clarity or explicitness the Court has otherwise
indicated should be required given the implications for state sovereignty.
The same can be said of the Court's broad interpretation of federal
question and removal jurisdiction. The Court has stated that "[d]ue regard
for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate
federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction
to the precise limits which the statute has defined. 11208 But the Court has not
adhered to its own admonition. Permitting arising under jurisdiction in the
face of congressional failure to provide for a private right of action is hardly
consistent with the admonition to "confine . . . jurisdiction to the precise
limits11209 defined by jurisdictional statutes. Similarly, although the Court has
insisted on a "strict construction" of the federal removal statutes,2 1 0
transmogrifying state law claims into federal claims through the complete
preemption doctrine is anything but a strict construction of the removal
statute, which requires that the removed claims "arise under" federal, not
state law. Both instances of overly-broad interpretations of federal
jurisdiction have the effect of ripping away from states the practical ability to
adjudicate state law claims that they have every right to adjudicate per the
Tenth Amendment in the absence of a valid exercise of Congressional
authority.

207. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).
208. Healy v. Ratta,292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).
209. Id.
210. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U. S. 100, 108 (194l ) ( "Not only does
the language ofthe Act of 1887 evidence the Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction
ofthe federal courts on removal,but the policy of the successive acts ofCongress regulating the
jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of such legislation.").
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D. Exceeding A rticle Ill 's Grant ofJurisdiction

Unwarranted expansions of federal jurisdiction result in vesting federal
courts with the ability to hear cases over which Article III fails to confer
jurisdiction. Thus, in the instance of the complete preemption doctrine, by
declaring that preempted state law claims "arise under" federal law when in
reality they do not gives federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving non
diverse parties where only state law claims are asserted, a category of cases the
federal judiciary is not empowered to hear. Congress, when legislating
pursuant to its constitutional authority, may always declare that preempted state
law claims indeed do arise under federal rather than state law and are thus
removable. However, the Supreme Court may not itself make such a
declaration; it may only enforce Congress's determination that such is the case.
Congress's extension of standing to Terri Schiavo' s parents to assert
claims on her behalf also drew the federal courts into a case not falling within
their Article III jurisdictional grant. The parents of Ms. Schiavo were not her
legal guardians but were permitted under the Act to pursue claims asserting
violations of Ms. Schiavo's rights, not their own. Under ordinarily applicable
principles, Ms. Schiavo's parents would lack both Article III standing and
prudential standing to assert the array of federal statutory and constitutional
violations they claimed in their suit. Article III standing requires the plaintiff to
have suffered an "injury in fact" that a favorable judgment will redress, while
prudential standing "encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant's raising
another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the
requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked. "2 1 1
Ms. Schiavo's parents spectacularly failed to meet these standards. The
injuries presented by her parents in federal court were alleged violations ofMs.
Schiavo's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act,2 1 2 the
Rehabilitation Act of 1 973,21 3 the Due Process Clause,2 14 and the Eighth
2 1 1 . Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. l , 1 2 (2004).
2 1 2. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d l l6 1 , l l 64 (M.D. Fla.
2005) ("Plaintiffs allege that the failure and refusal of Defendant Michael Schiavo to furnish
Theresa Schiavo with necessary and appropriate therapy, rehabilitation services and essential
medical services and his demand that she be deprived of food and water violate her rights under
the Americans with Disabilities Act.") (emphasis added).
2 1 3. Id. at 1 1 65 ("Plaintiffs allege that Hospice of Florida Sun Coast, Inc. violated Theresa
Schiavo's right to rehabilitation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1 973.") (citation omitted).
2 1 4. Id. at 1 1 66 ("Count Eight alleges that Theresa Schiavo's Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights were violated . . . . ").
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Amendment. 215 Presenting no injury of their own but merely those alleged to
have been suffered by one they could not claim to represent under Florida
law,216 Ms. Schiavo's parents clearly lacked Article III and prudential standing.
Because Article III standing is a constitutional requirement necessary for
federal jurisdiction, Congress is not empowered to waive the requirement under
any circumstances. Thus, the extension offederal jurisdiction to the parents of
Terri Schiavo was unconstitutional.
E. Doctrinal Hypocrisy

In the "Contract with America," Republicans promised that giving them
control of the House of Representatives would mean "the end of government
that is too big, too intrusive . . . ."2 1 7 But the same document promised to
introduce The Common Sense Legal Reform Act, a bill, which, as noted above,
sought to cap punitive damages awards in state law cases tried in state court, a
traditionally state-level prerogative.2 18 Indeed, it was widely known that the
philosophy behind the "Contract with America" was one of devolution of
power to the states,219 yet Republican controlled Congresses have been
responsible for the federal tort reform measures discussed above and for the
private legislation intervening in the Terri Schiavo case. President George W.
Bush, a Republican, has similarly mouthed the rhetoric of federalism: "The
framers of the Constitution did not believe in an all-knowing, all-powerful
Federal Government. They believed that our freedom is best preserved when
power is dispersed. That is why they limited and enumerated the Federal
Government's powers, and reserved the remaining functions of government to
the States. "220 Nevertheless, Mr. Bush also joined the Terri Schiavo
2 1 5. Id at 1 1 67 ("Plaintiffs assert that 'Judge Greer and Michael Schiavo, as state actors,
have vioated [sic] Terri Schiavo's Eighth Amendment rights by demonstrating a deliberate
indifference to a know [sic], substantial risk of serious harm . . . . "') (citation omitted).
2 1 6. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1384 (M.D. Fla.
2005) ("[T]he state court appointed Michael Schiavo, Theresa Schiavo's husband, as plenary
guardian and proxy for Theresa.").
217. Contract with America, http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html (last
visited Dec. 4, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., CONTRACT WITII AMERICA, supra note 7, at 1 25--41 (explaining the
Republican platform during the 104th Congress).
220. Remarks at the National Governors' Association Conference, 2001 PUB. PAPERS 13233 (Feb. 26, 2001 ), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001 /02/200 102268.html.
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bandwagon, favoring the promotion of "a culture of life" over adherence to the
federalist principles he ordinarily espouses.221
The Supreme Court also has embraced states' rights, articulating in a string of
cases over the past decade or so a robust vision ofconstitutional federalism.222 The
Court has intoned that "[i]t is an essential attribute ofthe States' retained sovereignty
that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of
authority,"223 invoking our system's "dual sovereignty" to invalidate congressional
efforts to protect women against violence,224 to keep school zones free of guns,225
and to require state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on
prospective handgun purchasers.226 At the same time, the Court has vacated state
imposed punitive damages awards,227 halted the recount process ordered by
Florida's highest court pursuant to state law in the exercise of authority granted to
states under Article 11,228 maintained the doctrines of implied229 and complete230

22 1 . Press Release, President George W. Bush, President's Statement on Terri Schiavo
(Mar. 1 7, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/200503 l 7-7 .html (last
visited Dec. 4, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
222. See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 25 ("Perhaps the most striking feature ofthe Rehnquist
Court's jurisprudence has been the revival over the last 5-10 years ofdoctrines ofconstitutional
federalism . . . . Not since before the New Deal-era constitutional revolution of 1 937 have the
states received such protection in the U.S. Supreme Court from allegedly burdensome federal
statutes.").
223 . Printz v. United States, 52 1 U.S. 898, 928 ( 1 997).
224. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (declaring 42 U.S.C.
§ 1 398 1 unconstitutional).
225. See United States v. Lopez, 5 1 4 U.S. 549, 552 ( 1 995) (invalidating the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 as exceeding the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause).
226. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 ("The Federal Government may neither issue directives
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.").
227. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) ("[l]n
practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages,
to a significant degree, will satisfy due process."); BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 5 1 7 U.S. 559,
575 ( 1 996) (striking down a punitive damages award of$2 million as "grossly excessive").
228. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 1 1 1 (2000) ("Seven Justices of the Court agree that
there are constitutional problems with the jurisdiction recount ordered by the Florida Supreme
Court that demand a remedy.").
229. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000) (holding that a safety
standard promulgated under the authority ofthe National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 1966 preempts a state common law action).
230. See Beneficial Nat'! Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 , 1 1 (2003) ("Because §§ 85 and 86
provide the exclusive cause ofaction for such claims, there is, in short, no such thing as a state
law claim of usury against a national bank.").

278

64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233 (2007)

preemption, and supplied expansive interpretations of federal jurisdictional
statutes.23 1
What is going on here? How is it that the advocates of devolution, states'
rights, dual sovereignty, and federalism are the progenitors of so much anti
federalist procedure? Apparently, most of those officials responsible for the
schizophrenic policies just described are fair-weather federalists. That is, their
belief in federalism is insufficiently principled to withstand the unfavorable
outcomes that sometimes result when states make their own decisions.2 32 Rep .
Christopher Shays of Connecticut, one of five House Republicans who voted
against Terri's Law, appeared to agree with this assessment when he stated,
"My party is demonstrating that they are for states' rights unless they don't like
what states are doing. . . . This couldn't be a more classic case of a state
responsibility. "233 Under the notion offair-weather federalism, then, when state
courts permit overly large punitive damages awards or too many frivolous
lawsuits, states' rights must take a back seat to federal tort reform.
If these strong advocates of states' rights are yielding federalism principles
on occasion, what principles are being favored in their stead? In the case of
Terri Schiavo, for some a sincere belief in the need to protect a "culture oflife"

231. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 320
(2005) (confirming federal court over state law quiet title claims if they present a contested
federal issue); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2625 (2005)
(allowing supplemental jurisdiction in diversity actions over plaintiffs who fail to meet the
amount-in-controversy requirement, as long as other diversity requirements are met and at least
one plaintiff satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement).
232. See, e.g., Jerome Ringler, The Unfairness ofthe Class Action Fairness Act, 29 L.A.
LAWYER 52, 52 (March 2006) ("[The Class Action Fairness Act] destroys a sacrosanct principle
among conservatives--federalism . . . . [I]t is hypocritical to brandish the Constitution and
publicly recite the Tenth Amendment while simultaneously erasing important rights among the
individual states."). This hypocrisy also manifests itself outside of matters of process; fair
weather federalists have sought to impose their substantive policy preferences on states in
various areas such as education and same-sex marriage. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (imposing national requirements intended to
close the achievement gap by providing accountability, flexibility, and choice); Remarks of
Pres. George W. Bush Calling for a Constitutional Amendment Defining and Protecting
Marriage, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 276 (Feb. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html ("Today I call upon the
Congress to promptly pass and send to the Senate for ratification an amendment to our
Constitution defining and protecting marriage as a union of man and woman as husband and
wife.").
233. Adam Nagourney, G.O.P. Right Is Splintered on Schiavo Intervention, N.Y.nMES,
Mar. 23, 2005, at A l 4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/23/politics/23repubs.
html?ei=5088&en=370f7363 l 5233 581&ex= l 269234000&partner=rssnyt&pagewanted=print
&position=.
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motivated their actions;234 for others, it is probably safe to surmise that politics
had something to do with it. In the area offederal tort reform, the nature of the
policies embodied in the legislation seems to indicate that federalism is yielding
to a desire to protect corporate defendants against certain kinds of suits. The
legislation seeking to limit punitive damages, the PSLRA and SLUSA, the
Class Action Fairness Act, and the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act all interfere
with state judicial authority in categories of cases where corporate defendants
face potentially large liability and have sought to make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to initiate and prevail in such cases. 235 The aim and effect of these
bills and enactments uniformly has been to alter state legal rules in ways that
favor such defendants rather than the parties seeking relief.
What explains the Supreme Court's moments of anti-federalism in the
midst of its federalism renaissance? In Bush v. Gore many have speculated that
raw politics motivated the Justices, given what was at stake in the case. 236 It is
not far fetched to suppose that the outcome their decision would bring about-a
Republican presidential victory-was squarely in mind when the five
"conservative" Justices decided the case as they did. 237 More certain is the fact
that the Court's due process remittitur jurisprudence is motivated by a distaste
for the outcomes produced by state courts awarding punitive damages. In cases
leading up to BMW ofNorth America v. Gore, Justice O'Connor remarked that
" [a]wards of punitive damages are skyrocketing, "238 while Justice Blackmun
expressed concern about "punitive damages that 'run wild. "'239 Further, as with
234. See id. ("[S]ome conservatives . . . argued that their opposition to euthanasia as part of
their support ofthe right-to-life movement trumped any aversion they might have to a dominant
federal government.").
235. See, e.g., Ringler, supra note 232, at 52 ("What these elected officials-Democrats
and Republicans alike-really object to is that too many class action lawsuits are successful. It
should come as no surprise that principal supporters of CAFA are large corporations (and
political contributors) that find themselves accused of wrongdoing.").
236. For example, David Strauss has stated:
The conclusion that emerges, in my view, is that several members of the Court
perhaps a majority-were determined to overturn any ruling ofthe Florida Supreme
Court that was favorable to Vice President Gore, at least if that ruling significantly
enhanced the Vice President's chances of winning the election.
Strauss, supra note 140, at 737-38.
237. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REv. 1 045, 1 063 (200 1 ) ("Bush v. Gore seems to involve 'low politics'
with the five conservatives adopting whatever arguments were necessary to ensure the election
of the Republican candidate, George W. Bush.").
238. Browning-Ferris Indus. ofVt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1 989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I , 1 8 ( 1 99 1 ).
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congressional tort reform efforts, the Court's excessiveness jurisprudence
benefits corporate defendants, whether by chance or by design.
Explaining the Court's anti-federalism with respect to preemption
doctrines and federal jurisdiction is more difficult. The federalist tendencies of
the Court have revealed themselves primarily in the context of limiting
Congress's ability to impose its will on the states, leading many to conclude
that the Court was vigorously protective of states' rights. However, the Court
has not been solicitous of states' rights when it comes to interpreting the scope
of federal jurisdiction or federal preemption. Is there an inconsistency here?
Yes, if the Court's effort to constrain congressional authority is viewed through
the prism of states' rights. However, as it turns out, the Court's invalidation of
Congressional action has not been so much a result of the Court's desire to
protect states as it has been an effort aimed at diminishing the power of
Congress to exercise plenary regulatory authority. 240 The Court's overly broad
views of federal jurisdiction and preemption have revealed a Court protective
of its own power or that of the federal courts in general vis-a-vis the states.
Thus, the two jurisprudential strains can both be seen as variants of the same
phenomenon: the Court's ascription of more power to itself and pursuit of
judicial supremacy.241 As one commentator stated it, "There is a Rehnquist
Court revolution in progress, and it is definitely not . . . a states' rights
revolution . . . . Rather, it is a separation of powers revolution that has to do
with the primacy of the judicial branch and of the Court itself. "242 Of course,
240. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 1 00 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83
(2001 ) ("In acting repeatedly to invalidate federal legislation, the Court is using its authority to
diminish the proper role of Congress."); see also Sylvia A. Law, In the Name ofFederalism:
The Supreme Court 's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 367, 371
(2002). Sylvia Law notes that:
[T]he Supreme Court has diminished the power of Congress to address national
problems in ways that we have not seen since the Taft Court Era and the
constitutionally disastrous period when the Court denied the New Deal Congress
and president the power to adopt federal responses to the Great Depression.
241. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Thinking about the Supreme Court after Bush v. Gore,
35 IND. L. REv. 435, 43fr37 (2002). As Linda Greenhouse points out:
People who think that what has motivated the Rehnquist Court in such cases as
United States v. Lopez, City ofBoerne v. Flores, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Alden v. Maine, Kimel v.
Florida Board ofRegents, and just last month, Board a/Trustees ofthe University
ofAlabama v. Garrett is states' rights are looking through the wrong end of the
constitutional telescope. The game that is really afoot is judicial supremacy . . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
242. Id. at 438.
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although judicial supremacy may be the practical result of the Court's
decisions, it is not possible to ascribe to the Court with any determinacy the
motive to achieve this end.
Nevertheless, a federalism-respecting approach to federal jurisdiction and
preemption demands that the Court restrain itself from self-aggrandizing
interpretations of congressional enactments when doing so interferes with the
traditionally recognized authority of state judiciaries to hear and manage state
law claims in their courts. The Court's rejection of congressional overreaching
under the Commerce Clause has largely been proper because the rejected
statutes were not properly aimed at regulating interstate commerce. However,
the Court's own inventions of implied and complete preemption and expansive
notions of arising under jurisdiction are no more legitimate from a
constitutional perspective, as has been shown above. Thus, the larger
inconsistency here is that the Court reprimands Congress for unsupported
forays into the regulation of states but itself indulges in the same.
I V. Towards Federalist Procedure

What would federalism-respecting procedure look like, specifically, in the
areas discussed above? Federalist procedure, in general, would take seriously
the limits imposed on federal authority-as exercised by all three branches
vis-a-vis the states by treading lightly in instances where traditional state
judicial authority might be imposed upon and declining to offend state judicial
prerogatives through implication. Such an approach would require the
wholesale repudiation of several doctrines and congressional enactments, but
would result in a legal landscape more in line with the principles of federalism
enshrined in the Constitution.
A . Limited Preemption

Justice Thomas perceives that the Court has an "increasing reluctance to
expand federal statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of implied pre
emption" in light of the belief that "pre-emption analysis is not ' [a]
freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with
federal objectives. "'243 If indeed there is such a growing reluctance, that would
243. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Gade v. Nat'! Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,
111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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be a promising move in the right direction. However, if the Court was
interested in fully embracing federalist procedure, it would need to reshape
preemption doctrine in the following manner.
1 . A bolition ofImplied Preemption

In order to respect principles offederalism and the sovereign authority of
states, the starting point for analyzing the preemptive effect of any federal law
that operates "in a field which the States have traditionally occupied"244 should
be a presumption against preemption. As Justice Stevens has explained:
Our presumption against pre-emption is rooted in the concept offederalism.
It recognizes that when Congress legislates "in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied . . . [,] we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. " 245
To depart from this presumption, then, the Court should require that the federal
law at issue contain a clear expression of congressional intent to preempt state
law. 246
a. Express Preemption Requirement

Given the weighty concerns underlying this presumption, courts should
only find the presence of a congressional intent to preempt state law when the
relevant federal statute contains an express preemption clause. Because states
are sovereigns within our federal system that retain the power to legislate and
adjudicate with respect to matters within their traditional sphere of authority,247
244. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
245. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230).
246. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
Because of the role of States as separate sovereigns in our federal system, we have
long presumed that state laws-particularly those, such as the provision of tort
remedies to compensate for personal injuries, that are within the scope of the
States' historic police powers-are not to be pre-empted by a federal statute unless
it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to do so.
Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) and Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes
Mgmt Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 116-117 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
247. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court stated:
[T]he Constitution of the United States . . . recognizes and preserves the autonomy
and independence of the States-independence in their legislative and
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the preemption ofstate law is a serious result that only congressional action can
achieve. Congress, not the courts, has the power of preemption; it is only for
the courts to enforce preemption in those circumstances where Congress has
imposed it. Congress clearly knows how to do this expressly and
unambiguously, given the innumerable occasions on which it has done so.
Certainly, then, federal statutes that fail to provide expressly for the preemption
of state law should not be read to do so anyway. Such a practice-which fairly
describes the Court's current doctrine ofimplied preemption-makes the courts
rather than Congress the progenitors of preemption, a role courts have no
authority to play.
b. Scope ofPreemption Limited to Terms ofExpress Provision

Further, when Congress includes an express preemption clause in a
statute, courts should confine the preemptive effect ofthe statute on state law to
those instances covered by the express provision. By specifically delineating
the domain expressly preempted by the statute, Congress should be viewed as
having intended to limit the scope of preemption to that domain. As the
Supreme Court explained in a now emasculated opinion that suggested support
for such a rule,
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included
in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and
when that provision provides a "reliable indicium of congressional intent
with respect to state authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent
to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions" of the legislation.
Such reasoning is a variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius: Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre
emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not
pre-empted. 248

The Court inexplicably backpeddled from this position in Freightliner
Corp. v. Myric/<49 by writing, "The fact that an express definition of the preindependence in their judicial departments. Supervision over either the legislative
or the judicial action of the States is in no case pennissible except as to matters by
the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any
interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of
the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.
Id. at 78-79.
248. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (citations omitted).
249. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995) (holding that the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act did not expressly or implicitly preempt state common law
design defect claims).
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emptive reach of a statute 'implies'-i.e., supports a reasonable inference-that
Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the
express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption."250
This position must be abandoned. Again, Congress alone holds the power of
preemption. By exercising that power in a definitive and unambiguous fashion
through an express preemption provision, there is no room for courts to say that
Congress intended to say more and preempt more but for some reason was
reticent. Such a maneuver is nothing more than judicially-created preemption
that illegitimately impinges on states' legitimate sphere of authority.
c. Savings Clauses as a Bar to Implied Preemption

Worse still is the circumstance in which courts imply preemption
notwithstanding the presence of a savings clause expressly declaring that
certain state laws or legal actions are not preempted. Savings clauses, which
spell out the extent to which a congressional enactment does not preempt state
law, should serve as an absolute bar to field and obstacle preemption.
Nevertheless, the Court has determined that a savings clause only "saves" state
legal rules or remedies from the scope of any express preemption clause, not
from the reach of any implied preemption that courts may discern.251
Federalism-respecting procedure would reject this reasoning and treat savings
clauses as foreclosing any recourse to implied preemption. Of course,
adherence to the previous two rules-no preemption in the absence of an
express preemption provision and preemption limited in scope to the terms of
the express provision-already eliminate implied preemption in toto, rendering
savings clauses not much more than a belt-and-suspenders approach.
It should be noted that none of these rules preclude a finding of
preemption in cases where it is impossible to comply both with federal and state
law. Even where Congress neglects to insert an express preemption clause in a
federal statute, when federal and state law collide to such an extent that the
compliance with one necessitates the violation of the other, the federal law
trumps or preempts the conflicting state law purely by direct application of the
Suprema-;y Clause. Article VI, clause 2 provides, "This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall
250. Id. at 288.
251. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) ("We have just said
that the saving clause at least removes tort actions from the scope of the express pre-emption
clause. . . . We now conclude that the saving clause (like the express preemption provision) does
not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.").
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be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding. "252 Thus, Congress, when validly legislating pursuant to its
constitutional authority, need not expressly declare any intention that its law
preempt any contrary state law with which simultaneous compliance would be
impossible; the Supremacy Clause of its own force declares that result. The
preemption that results is in no sense "implied" as the Supreme Court has
stated;253 quite to the contrary, such preemption is the most basic and express
form of preemption that exists because the express terms of the Supremacy
Clause ("any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding") call for it.
In sum, a preemption doctrine that respects federalism principles should
abandon implied preemption-specifically "obstacle" and "field" preemption
and confine itself to instances of express preemption and situations where it is
impossible to comply both with federal and state law.254
2. Narrow Construction

When reading federal statutes to determine their preemptive effect, courts
should construe those statutes narrowly-consistent with their stated purpose-
in order to avoid unnecessary and improper preemption of state law. The
Supreme Court provided a good example of this practice recently in Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences255 where it faced the question of whether state law damages
claims against the sellers of a certain pesticide were preempted by the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).256 Specifically, because
FIFRA provided that states "shall not impose or continue in effect any
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those
required under this subchapter" the question was whether successful state tort

252. U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2.
253. See Freightliner Corp., 5 1 4 U.S. at 287 ("We have found implied conflict pre
emption where it is 'impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements."') (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).
254. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption,
33 PEPP. L. REv. 69, 74-75 (2005) ("I think there should be only two situations when there is
preemption of state law. One is express preemption. The other is when federal law and state
law are mutually exclusive, so it is not possible for somebody to comply with both.").
255. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 43 1 (2005).
256. Id. at 434.
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claims would create a state common law labeling requirement in contravention
of this provision in the Act. 257
Rather than reading the preemption clause of FIFRA broadly to prohibit
any state judicial action that would influence sellers to alter their labeling, the
Court held that only state legal rules that required manufacturers to label or
package their products in a particular way would be preempted by FIFRA. 258
Finding that "[r]ules that require manufacturers to design reasonably safe
products, to use due care in conducting appropriate testing of their products, to
market products free of manufacturing defects, and to honor their express
warranties or other contractual commitments plainly do not qualify as
requirements for ' labeling or packaging,"' the Court concluded that
"petitioners' claims for defective design, defective manufacture, negligent
testing, and breach of express warranty are not pre-empted. "259 In rejecting the
lower court's "effects-based test" that sought to bring labeling-influencing state
court judgments within the ambit of FIFRA' s preemption provision, the Court
properly confined the statute to the reading that respected state sovereign
authority by not requiring the preemption of many important state law claims.
Another example of narrow construction can be found in Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co. , a case this Article has already discussed.260 The
express preemption provision of the statute at issue in Geier, the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act), provides:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either
to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or
item of motor vehicle equipment[,] any safety standard applicable to the
same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is
not identical to the Federal standard.261

The question for the Court was whether the use of the term "standard" rather
than "requirement" in the statute meant that the preemption provision failed to
embrace tort actions since the Court had previously held that the word
"requirement" included such actions. Although the Court felt that "it is
possible to read the pre-emption provision, standing alone, as applying to
standards imposed in common-law tort actions," the Court concluded that such
a "broad reading" would render the Safety Act's savings clause-which
preserves potential "liability at common law" notwithstanding compliance with
257.
258.
259.
260.
261 .

Id. at 436.

Id. at 444.
Id.
See supra Part II.A (discussing Geier in an implied preemption context).

1 5 U.S.C. § l 392(d) (1988) (repealed 1994) (emphasis added).
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the Safety Act-meaningless. 262 In opting for the "narrow reading that
excludes common-law actions," the Court again comported itself in a
manner consistent with principles of federalist procedure. 263
B. The Proper Regulation ofInterstate Commerce

Moving definitively towards federalist procedure requires a substantial
paring back of Congress's ability to regulate state courts under the
Commerce Clause. Two main pronouncements from the Supreme Court
would achieve this end: ( 1 ) a prohibition against regulating state court
jurisdiction and procedure via the Commerce Clause or (2) the wholesale
adoption of a strict prohibition against regulating non-economic activity
thought to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce in the name of
the Commerce Clause.
The error of regulating state court efforts to adjudicate commercial
disputes has already been made clear.264 Such adjudication constitutes non
economic activity but more importantly consists of the exercise, by states,
of their sovereign authority to resolve disputes arising under their own
laws. While the substantial effects test itself is of questionable validity,265
its invocation to uphold direct congressional regulation of state court
jurisdiction and procedure should never be countenanced given the
resultant subversion of basic principles of dual sovereignty and
federalism. 266 Because the latter of the two proposals-the wholesale
abandonment of the substantial effects test in the context of non-economic
activity-would affect Congress's power not only respecting anti-federalist
procedure but also all non-economic activity, opting for the former
proposal would be the more cautious approach.

262. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 ( "On that broad reading of the pre-emption clause little, ifany,
potential 'liability at common law' would remain. And few, if any, state tort actions would
remain for the saving clause to save. ").
263. Id.
264. See supra Part II.A (discussing the impropriety and overreaching of the Court's
finding of implied preemption in Geier).
265. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. I , 67 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ( "[T]he
'substantial effects' test is a 'rootless and malleable standard' at odds with the constitutional
design.") (quoting U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 ( 1 999) (Thomas, J.,concurring)).
266. Cf id. at 65 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ( " Congress may not use its incidental authority to
subvert basic principles of federalism and dual sovereignty.").
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C. Narrowly Construed Federal Jurisdiction
To place the scope of federal jurisdiction back within its proper
confines, the Supreme Court will have to take two radical steps: (1) adopt
Justice Holmes's "Creation Test" for determining the presence of federal
question jurisdiction and (2) abolish the complete preemption doctrine.
Further, to undo the substantial expansion offederaljurisdiction worked by the
Court' s correct interpretation ofthe supplemental jurisdiction statute, Congress
must amend the statute to clarify its apparent original intent that claims by
parties joined under Rule 23 not receive the benefit ofsupplemental jurisdiction
in diversity cases.
1 . A doption ofHolmes 's "Creation Test"

The court's current view of arising under jurisdiction pursuant to the
federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is that it confers federal
jurisdiction both over claims created by federal law and state law claims that
implicate substantial federal issues. 267 Virtually all complexity in this body of
law derives from the latter portion ofthis statement. That is, the Court's federal
question cases have almost uniformly concerned themselves with determining
the circumstances under which state law claims may nonetheless be deemed to
arise under federal law.268 Given the sovereign authority ofstates to adjudicate
claims created by their respective laws and the traditional understanding that
state courts are competent to resolve federal issues, broadly interpreting federal
267. Grable & Sons Metal Prods. Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 3 1 2 (2005).
268. See, e.g. , Merrell Dow Phann. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 8 1 7 ( 1 986) (holding
that a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action
does not state a claim arising under federal law when Congress has determined that there should
be no private federal cause of action); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. l , 28 ( 1 983) (holding that a suit by state tax authorities to enforce its
levies against funds held in a trust pursuant to an ERISA-covered employee benefit plan is
neither a creature of ERISA itselfnor a suit which turns on a question of federal law); Gully v.
First Nat'! Bank, 299 U.S. 1 09, 1 1 2 ( 1 936) ("To bring a case within [a federal] statute, a right or
immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an
essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action."); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S.
180, 1 99 ( 1 92 1 ) (holding that an ultra vires claim under state law against a corporation that
invested funds in the bonds of Congressionally created banks, on grounds that the
Congressional creation acts themselves were unconstitutional, states a claim that arises under
federal law); Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 490-9 1 ( 1 9 1 7) (providing federal jurisdiction
over a state quiet title action that involved the construction and effect of U.S. mining laws);
Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 56 1 , 569 ( 1 9 1 2) (finding that a suit involving rights to land
acquired under a law of the United States does not necessarily raise a federal question).
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arising under jurisdiction to include state law claims is both unnecessary and
offensive to state sovereignty. The Court has noted in the past that respect for
state sovereignty must factor into determinations of the scope of federal
question jurisdiction: "We have consistently emphasized that, in exploring the
outer reaches of § 1 33 1 , determinations about federal jurisdiction require
sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal
system." 269 Unfortunately, the Court's own view of arising under jurisdiction
in Grable & Sons gives too little regard to federalist concerns.
A federalism-respecting approach to federal question jurisdiction demands
the adoption of the so-called "creation test" originally propounded by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Under the creation test, "A suit arises under the law
that creates the cause of action. ,,21o That means that § 1 3 3 1 jurisdiction would
be confined to "cases in which federal law creates the cause of action pleaded
on the face of the plaintiff's complaint."27 1 In addition to having the benefit of
clarity and simplicity,2 72 the creation test conforms with the meaning one must
ascribe to the "arising under" language of the statute iffederalism concerns are
to be honored. That is, not only is it strained to say that a case arising under
state law nonetheless arises under federal law because of the presence of an
embedded substantial federal issue, but it is a strained interpretation used to
encroach upon cases that unquestionably fall within the jurisdiction of state
courts. Certainly, sensitivity to the federal system demands that the Court opt
for the more natural and less offensive interpretation of § 1 3 3 1 until Congress
gives some clear indication of its intent to the contrary.
One should be clear that confining federal question jurisdiction in the
manner herein proposed does not mean the relinquishment offederal control over
vast instances of critical matters offederal law. The Supreme Court would retain
the ability to review state decisions on federal issues through its certiorari
jurisdiction.273 However, were the Court disinclined to move in this direction269. Merrell Dow Phann. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 8 1 0 ( 1 986).
270. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 24 1 U.S. 257, 260 ( 1 9 1 6).
27 1 . Grable & Sons Metal Prods. Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 320 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
272. The clarity ofthe creation test is the principal attribute that commends adoption ofthe
rule to Justice Thomas:
Whatever the vices of the American Well Works rule, it is clear. Moreover, it
accounts for the vast majority of cases that come within § 1 3 3 1 under our current
case law-further indication that trying to sort out which cases fall within the
smaller Smith category may not be worth the effort it entails.
Id. at 32 1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
273. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 8 1 6 ("[E]ven ifthere is no original district courtjurisdiction
for these kinds of action, this Court retains power to review the decision of a federal issue in a
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which is likely to be the case given the unanimity of the Grable decision (Justice
Thomas' nod in this direction notwithstanding)--Congress could achieve this
result legislatively by amending § 1331 as follows: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions in which the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States create the claims asserted therein." The virtue of
this route would be the certainty provided by clear words from Congress and
the elimination of any need to rely on the Court's potentially changeable
interpretation of § 1331 's existing language.
2. A bolition of the Complete Preemption Doctrine

The doctrine of complete preemption should be abolished to the extent
that the Court infers its existence in any given case. Congress of course retains
the authority to provide expressly for the removability of preempted state law
claims, as it has done in the past,274 and the Court would be obliged to enforce
such a provision. Further, state law claims preempted by statutes where
Congress adopted the language approved in Avco Corp. v. International
A ssociation ofMachinist and A erospace Workers275 as indicative of an intent to
permit complete preemption removal should continue to be removable not by
operation of the complete preemption doctrine but rather to honor the clear
expression of congressional intent that such be the case.276 This is what
occurred in MetropolitanLife Ins. Co. v. Taylor,277 where the Court held that
complete preemption supported the removal of state common law causes of
action asserting improper processing of benefit claims under a plan regulated
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).278 They did so
because ERISA's "jurisdiction subsection, § 502(f), used language similar to
the statutory language construed in Avco, thereby indicating that the two
statutes should be construed in the same way" and "the legislative history of
ERISA unambiguously described an intent to treat such actions 'as arising
state cause of action." (citing Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U. S. 205, 2 1 4- 1 5
(1934))).
274. See, e.g. , El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U. S. 473, 484-85 ( 1999)
(discussing the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U. S. C.§ 2014(hh)).
274. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing A vco).
276. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U. S. 1 , 2 1-22 ( Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I
would adhere to the approach taken by Taylor and on the basis of stare decisis simply affirm,
without any real explanation, that the LMRA and statutes modeled after it have a 'unique pre
emptive force' that (quite illogically) suspends the normal rules of removal jurisdiction.").
277. Metro. Life Ins. Co., v Taylor, 48 1 U. S. 58 ( 1987).
278. Id. at 64-66.
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under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.'"279
3. Legislative Overro/ing ofAllapattah Services

As already noted, the Court was correct in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services Inc. to interpret the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28

U.S.C. § 1367, to allow supplemental jurisdiction over jurisdictionally
insufficient claims asserted by parties in diversity actions joined under Rules 20
or 23 .280 However, given the broad implications ofsuch an interpretation-that
only named plaintiffs in class actions will have to satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement-Congress should amend the statute to reinstate the
holding of Zahn v. International Paper Co. 281 Specifically, an amended
§ 1367(b) would read as follows (with inserted language italicized):
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded solely on section 1 332 ofthis title, the district courts shall not have
supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs
against persons made parties under Rule 14, 1 9, 20, or 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined
as plaintiffs under Rule 1 9 of such rules,joined asplaintiffs under Rule 20
of such rules, proceeding as members of a class under Rule 23 of such
rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules,
when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.

Making this change would prevent litigants from circumventing the
ordinary requirement of the diversity statute, as interpreted by Zahn, that
jurisdiction is proper only over those claims "where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000" and that insufficient claims of multiple
plaintiffs may not piggyback on a claim that has satisfied the required
amount. 282 Under the current version of§ l 367(b) as interpreted by the Court,
the named class representative could assert a claim for $75,001 and remaining
class members could each assert negligible claims for $1 each. Diversity
279. Beneficial Nat '/ Bank, 539 U.S. at 7-8 (quoting Metro. life, 48 1 U.S. at 65---06).
280. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 1 25 S. Ct. 261 1 , 262 1 (2005) ("The
natural, indeed the necessary, inference is that § 1 367 confers supplemental jurisdiction over
claims by . . . Rule 23 plaintiffs.").
28 1 . See Zahn v. Int'! Paper Co., 414 U.S. 29 1 , 300 ( 1 973) (holding that in the context ofa
class action invoking diversity jurisdiction, every plaintiffmust separately satisfy the amount-in
controversy requirement of the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1 332).
282. Id. at 30 1 .
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jurisdiction has not been made available for those claims and supplemental
jurisdiction has been extended to them apparently only accidentally. Clearly,
with Congress's passage of the Class Action Fairness Act, it indicated the
degree to which it wished to permit the aggregation of class action claims in
order to enjoy federal jurisdiction. It makes no sense then for Congress to leave
§ 1367(b) in its current state because it allows class actions that aggregate to
less than $5 million (the CAFA amount)283 into the federal courthouse,
notwithstanding CAFA's $5 million requirement.
D. General Principles

Beyond these specific reforms, it is worth sketching out several general
principles of federalist procedure that should guide Congress and the federal
courts in enacting and interpreting laws in ways that respect principles of
federalism and state sovereign authority:
First, under no circumstances should Congress be permitted to prescribe
procedure to be applied within state courts adjudicating state law claims. If
Congress wants certain types of claims to be handled in a particular fashion, it
must legislate in the area and expressly preempt state law, so that such cases
can be treated as federal claims triable in the federal courts where Congress can
directly control procedure if it wishes.
Second, all doubts or ambiguities regarding federal jurisdictional statutes
should be resolved against jurisdiction where a contrary interpretation would
interfere with the ability of state courts to hear and adjudicate state law claims
traditionally within their sphere of authority. In effect, there should be a strong
presumption against federal jurisdiction over state law claims unless Congress
has made plain its intent to the contrary. The jurisdiction of the federal courts
should not be expanded through judicial implication when state law claims are
at issue. Indeed, in our system of constitutional federalism, it may even be
appropriate to consider embracing a canon of statutory construction that obliges
courts to read statutes with an eye towards respecting state sovereign authority
and the notion of reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment.
Third, Congress must stop playing politics with procedure. Procedural
rules in the civil context must be motivated by establishing, ex ante, a fair and
efficient process for resolving disputes, not with an eye towards facilitating a
particular outcome. More often than not, anti-federalist procedure has been the
product of thinly-veiled efforts to manipulate process in a manner that will yield
283. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing CAFA provisions).
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or facilitate a desired substantive outcome: lower and fewer punitive damages
awards, fewer certified class actions, fewer securities fraud lawsuits, a ruling to
reinsert life support for Terri Schiavo, and a Republican victory in a
Presidential election. The sovereign authority of states to control their
judiciaries and to adjudicate state law claims are rights preserved by the Tenth
Amendment that should not cavalierly be trampled upon for the sake of mean
political ends.
V. Conclusion

Constitutional federalism is an important value that deserves to be upheld
consistently by Congress and the Supreme Court. Though a preponderance of
the members of both of these branches of government are self-professed
federalists, some of them have too often indulged in anti-federalist policies and
doctrines when the authority of state courts hung in the balance. No longer can
such lapses be tolerated. The reforms proposed above go a good way towards
bringing respect for constitutional federalism into relations between the federal
government and state judiciaries. Hopefully, policy leaders and members of the
Supreme Court who espouse a belief in limited federal government and a
respect for state sovereign authority will have the courage of their convictions
to move in this direction notwithstanding the substantive policy consequences
that may result. If principle can prevail over politics, our national government
can be pushed back within the confines of the limited authority the Founders
envisioned.

